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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Michael James Thacker
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Economics
June 2016
Title: Essays on the Economics of Telephones and Evolving Technologies
Telephones have changed dramatically from their introduction to their current form,
and done so most significantly since the introduction of cell phones in the 1980s. This has
impacted competition in the telephony market. I study this competitive impact of cell
phones on the landline market through demand analysis in the first two essays; I turn my
attention to the smartphone market in the final essay.
In the first essay, I examine the effect of cell phones on telephony demand using the
Consumer Expenditure Survey. I develop and estimate a model of household choice using
a mixed logit as a function of consumer characteristics, unobserved alternative-specific
attributes, and prices. My focus is on the evolution through time. I construct market
segments and track adoptions. Evidence suggests that the move to cell phones is driven
by young and and large housholds. I develop and apply a decomposition of substitutability
and find that substitutability differs through time.
Cell phone technologies and consumer culture have changed dramatically since 1983,
affecting the level of competition in the regulated telephony market. In the second essay,
I develop an empirical strategy to estimate changing demand that addresses changing
technologies and preferences. I develop a flexible methodology that allows for likelihood-
based estimation of a broad class of latent-dependent-variable models with time-varying
iv
parameters. Applying my methodology with a logit model and Bayesian methods, I study
the evolution of preferences. Consumers have become more price-sensitive, indicating
that improvements to cell phones have provided an increasing competitive constraint on
landline pricing.
In the third essay, I develop a model of the US smartphone industry; consumers
demand products according to a random utility model; firms compete in a dynamic
oligopoly model; I incorporate supply-side learning. Firms learn demand through time
inspired by recursive least squares adaptive learning. Firms choose whether to release new
devices and when to remove devices from the market according to expected future profits.
I estimate fixed costs in this market, finding a competitive environment with significant
fixed costs. Results show large entry costs and scrap values driven by substantial
intellectual property related to technology products.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The United States telecommunications industry has dramatically changed in the last
four decades. Dominated by a single firm in the early 1980s, today’s telephony market is
dominated by multiple firms selling technology that would have been hard to recognize in
the 1980s. Regulatory public policy, as well as technological advances and competitive
forces, have played roles in this market’s transformation that has been dramatic both
in terms of the pace and the amount of change. My research focuses on the dynamic
evolution of technology, competition, and demand that is essential for informing regulatory
policy. Herein, I present research that implements modern demand models, develops
innovative econometric tools, and incorporates theory from the industrial economics
literature that builds on established models by incorporating supply-side learning.
Since the 1980s, cell phone adoption has been rapid and has reached the
vast majority of consumers in the United States. Today, there are more cell phone
subscriptions than there are people in the United States (cti [2013]). I begin my study of
technological evolution in Chapter 2; I use a 19-year period of the Consumer Expenditure
Survey to estimate household choice between telephony alternatives using discrete
choice methods. The results are insensitive to different specifications I implement, and I
find that the massive level of cell phone adoption is driven by both larger and younger
households. Turning my attention back to the competition- and policy-relevant question
of substitutability, I develop a decomposition of a substitutability measure, a measure
originally formulated by Gentzkow [2007a]. Having estimated multiple logit specifications,
I apply these results and my decomposition to evaluate the substitutability of cell phones
for landlines. In doing so, I find that substitutability differs through time and by market
segment, thereby unifying previous literature with conflicting results for different time-
1
periods, and suggesting that in today’s market, landlines do face increasing competitive
effects from cell phones.
In Chapter 2, I develop and estimate a mixed logit of consumer choice, and inform
the policy question of substitutability by pairing my decomposition of Gentzkow [2007a]’s
substitutability measure with the results of the discrete choice model. In Chapter 3, I
further study the effects of technological change on consumer demand. In particular,
the change in cell phones is and has been significant over time. While observables such
as price and incomes allow some changes to be directly evaluated, I develop a model in
Chapter 3, motivated by Engle [2014], that allows the parameters of the utility functions
to change over time. In particular, I model each parameter of the utility function as
a random walk with drift. As Engle [2014] states, while there are many assumptions
with which economists concern themselves, “in practice, it may be unstable regression
coefficients that are most troubling. Rarely is there credible economic rationale for
the assumption that the slope coefficients are time invariant.” I develop a likelihood
approach to estimating time-varying parameter models with latent dependent-variables
for use in discrete choice. I then use this technique to estimate a discrete choice logit
model using Bayesian methods in the US telephony market. This work uses Adaptive
Metropolis Hastings and my adaptation of Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez
[2004]’s sequential Monte Carlo algorithm and shows that, in addition to the insights
presented in Chapter 2, consumer households are more price sensitive through time.
Specifically, this work separates the improved technology of the cell phone alternative from
its effect on price sensitivity by making landlines less essential for all households.
If cellular telephony developed significantly from its US debut until the mid-2000s,
it is smartphones that have developed significantly since then. Characterized by the
latest-and-greatest technology and inflated advertising budgets, the smartphone is the
juggernaut in today’s US technology market. Indeed, the highest selling individual
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device brand, the Apple iPhone, is a large part of Apple Inc.’s claim as one of the largest
company in the world by market cap. In Chapter 4, I turn my attention to this segment of
the cell phone market to understand the way in which firms compete, the costs associated
with innovation and product development, and the value of different product attributes to
consumers. I develop a dynamic theoretical model of competition in the spirit of Ericson
and Pakes [1995a]. I follow Bajari et al. [2007]’s estimation methodology and extend
it to allow for supply-side learning with an iterative version of Berry et al. [1995] with
which firms learn about demand for product attributes through time. I find evidence of
substantial fixed costs for firms associated with both entering the market, and releasing
devices once entered and competing in the market. Additionally, my work reveals that
these entry costs are similar in magnitude to scrap values reflecting the substantial role of
intellectual property in this market; that is, firms have the ability to sell their intellectual
property if they exit the market.
As discussed, each chapter focuses on applied research modelling a policy-relevant
problem related to US telecommunications markets. Each focuses first on describing
the relevant problem and what has been done to research it in the past. I then turn
my attention to a conceptual model about how the market works and how this can be
modelled empirically. I then present an empirical strategy to econometrically estimate
the model using data. In each of the chapters, I apply different econometric tools. The
second uses maximum likelihood, the third uses Bayesian econometric methods, and the
fourth chapter includes generalized method of moments, instrumental variables, and a
minimum distance estimator. I then present results and the value of those contributions,
and conclude. Chapter 5 reiterates the contributions of, and concludes, my dissertation
research.
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CHAPTER II
TELEPHONY CHOICES AND THE EVOLUTION OF CELL PHONES
Introduction
Over the last three decades, telephony markets have changed dramatically due to
the divestiture of the local telephone operations of AT&T, the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, and the introduction of cellular telephones. The first cell phone call was made
in 1973, and in 1983 cell phones were made commercially available. While growth was
initially slow, cell phone usage has expanded rapidly over the last 20 years as a result
of lower prices, new service offerings, and network effects. My primary objective in this
paper is to examine the effects of the introduction and adoption of cell phones. I focus
on household choices of telephony over time and by market segment. This allows me
to identify growth segments and to examine the policy question of substitutability by
market segment over time. I employ and extend a substitutability measure developed
by Gentzkow [2007b]. The extension allows a decomposition of the substitutability
measure by source. My research makes two primary contributions to the literature. First,
my results point directly to the impact cell phones have had on the broader telephony
market and what has driven this impact. Second, I develop and apply a methodology
that decomposes substitutability by source and points to the evolution of the market.
This methodology can be employed to investigate substitutability in a variety of evolving
markets.
The landline service market has been highly regulated and the broader telephony
market is one that impacts the vast majority of individuals living in the United
States. In 1984, there was a divestiture of AT&T’s local landline operations after a
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landmark antitrust case.1 This, along with the Telecommunications Act of 1996, brought
significant regulatory effects on the landline market. The simultaneous appearance and
evolution of cell phones only propagated further competitive effects on the previously
uncompetitive market. One of the primary questions is to what degree the availability
of cell phones limits landline pricing. As recently as 2008, the Department of Justice
[2008] reported that “The size of [the] wireless substitution effect is not known...” and “the
available evidence does not establish that mobile services currently represent an effective
competitive constraint on landline access pricing.” Others disagree, including Taylor and
Ware [2008] who responded that “data on price trends and substitution of cell for landline
services show that mobile services currently represent an effective competitive constraint
on landline access pricing.” The question needs further investigation and more definitive,
quantifiable answers, which I provide. In particular, this issue comes down to the extent to
which cell phone services have become effective substitutes for landline services. I estimate
demand and substitutability through time and find that developments in cell phone
service since the implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 have changed
the competitive environment for landline telephony providers. This has happened in ways
similar to those discussed by Gentzoglanis and Henten [2010] when discussing intermodal
competition; telecommunications networks have converged so that networks originally
designed to carry one type of traffic can now carry a variety of traffic types. Indeed, these
changes “have made retail markets for telecommunications services effectively competitive”
(Gentzoglanis and Henten [2010]). All of this points to diminished need for regulation in
the landline market.
There are a number of studies that examine the demand for telephony services.
These studies, e.g. Train et al. [1987], examine the choice between different pricing
mechanisms, i.e. measured service versus flat fee service. Rodini et al. [2003a] examine
1Further discussion of this regulatory change through the 1980s can be found in Crandall [1988].
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the substitution of landline and cell phone service access. Macher et al. [2013a] examine
household choices among landline and cell phone services using a portfolio approach and
data from 2003 to 2010. In this study, I observe data over a more extended period of time
(1994-2012) during which cell phone use increased from less than 4% of U.S. households
to nearly 80%. Observing these data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES),
I directly examine the choices made between four options of telephony service. These
options are: landline, cell phone, both landline and cell, and no service. I first frame these
choices in terms of socio-economic factors. I then develop a procedure to uncover prices
from the CES and estimate a fixed coefficient choice model with prices and household
attributes. The price proxies from the CES are consistent with the Consumer Price Index
categories for the overlapping time-periods.2 I then extend the model to allow households
to place different levels of importance on prices by estimating a mixed logit. All of my
specifications also include alternative-specific dummy variables, which capture effects of
unobserved product attributes. I include these multiple specifications to demonstrate the
robustness of my results and provide further credibility to my price proxy.3
In an industry that has seen so much change, it is important to understand what has
driven the evolution of market demand. The usable data run from 1994 to 2012, which
is substantially longer than prior studies and allow estimation that considers evolution.
Using the estimates, I develop consumer profiles and trace adoption rates through time. I
find that there are dramatic differences across household types in their telephony choice
and adoption through time. Indeed, households of young single people are far more likely
2I considered other options for a price measure; however, the alternatives would not allow the entirety
of the 19-year sample-period to be used. I did, however, compare my measures of price with other
measures during overlapping time-periods, and found that my prices trend in the same direction and
are highly correlated with other measures I found.
3In addition to the included specifications, I estimated a binary logit for landline using cell phone price
as a right-hand-side variable and found that these two services appear to be complementary. Of course,
this and previous literature, e.g. Rodini et al. [2003a], further motivate specifications that consider the
evolution of the industry.
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to choose cell rather than landline, while those of older people or those with larger families
are more likely to choose cell phones in addition to landline phones.4
These results also suggest that cell phones and landlines may be substitutes for
some households and complements for others. Gentzkow [2007b] developed a measure
to examine substitutability of hard-copy and online newspaper subscriptions, while
Macher et al. [2013a] adopt it for substitutability in the telephony market. I follow
Gentzkow [2007b] to examine substitutability, then develop and estimate a decomposition
of this measure, which extends this literature. An important feature of my innovation
is its applicability in understanding changes in the telephony market with the evolution
of cell phones and in providing deeper understanding about the level of competition
between technologies in the market in the past and present. I provide a framework
around this decomposition and its estimation that can be adopted to study other markets
in which substitutability is changing through time. As technology continues to evolve
across industries, my decomposition may be conducive to understanding the changing
competition between firms in related markets in a variety of evolving industries. For
example, I suggest the possibility that this could be used to see how mobile technology
impacts competition in the cable or broadband internet market, or how evolving
infrastructure impacts competition between local transportation methods such as public
transit and automobile.
Results from applying my decomposition provide strong evidence that the
substitutability of cell phone and landline varies over time and by market segment. At
the beginning of my sample period, most market segments view these two services as
complementary. By the end of the sample period, most of these same market segments
view these two services as substitutable, suggesting that the landline telephone market
4My results are consistent with Macher et al. [2013a] in how non-price household characteristics matter.
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has experienced increasing competition from cell phones; this may guide regulatory-policy
decisions based on the level of competition in the entire telephony market.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces further
history and details of the telecommunications industry as well as how this paper fits in
to the relevant literature. The models are detailed in Section 2.3. The data source and
variables for the project are discussed in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 presents the results of the
estimation followed by Section 2.6, which concludes.
Background
The adoption and evolution of cell phones has had a tremendous impact in our
culture. Since the original telephone was created in 1876, telephony has grown and evolved
at a rapid pace. The car phone, developed in 1946, is considered to be the first step
towards modern mobile communications.5 Despite the many inconveniences that arose
with these mobile devices, a large consumer base emerged (Klemens [2010]). Interest in
mobile phones spurred technological innovation leading to the first cellular device.
First generation cell phones were analog based and limited to voice communication
that could be connected to wired forms (Hanson [2007]). Dr. Martin Cooper, a
Motorola researcher and executive, made the very first cellular phone call in 1973
(HistoryOfCellPhones.net [2008]). After several years of testing and negotiations
between the government and telecommunication companies, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), in 1983, gave permission for commercial cellular service. That same
year, the first cell phone and first cell phone service provider entered the market.6 Around
the same time, 1982, the AT&T monopolization case was resolved, and subsequently
forced the divestiture of the company’s local landline operations by 1984. This was a
5The car phone was not a cellular device; instead it was a combination of radio and telephone.
6The Motorola DynaTAC 8000X and Ameritech Mobile Communications (Ameritech), respectively.
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major change in telephony markets, but the cell phone was not yet an affordable product,
available only to those with high income or with an employer covering the expense
(Klemens [2010]). In 1987, the FCC opened another frequency for cell phone providers
to use, which lead to the second generation (2G) cell phone.7 The 2G phones supported
text features, camera functions, and audio and video downloading (Hanson [2007]).8 As
the cost of cell phone service plans decreased, the variety of services began to grow, and
cell phone towers were modified to extend the range of making calls (Hanson [2007]). As
a result, cell phone service took off as a legitimate method of communication and lead
the way to development of third generation (3G) cell phones. As time progressed, cellular
services improved, and the capability of 3G cell phones increased. The transition to 3G
cell phones commenced in 2002, and by 2009, most of the world was using 3G networks.
The biggest change in the 3G cell phone was its capability for data transmission.9
Specifically, it allowed faster Internet access (Gruber [2005]).
One of the main factors that likely determined the success of the cell phone was its
decreasing price through time. In the cell phone industry, technological progress is rapid
and innovations are readily available to all operators in the market, so that innovative
services can easily and quickly be copied by the competition. As a result, cell phone
services soon became a relatively homogeneous good. The increased competition lead to
price cuts and made mobile services affordable for the low-spending consumer segment, the
mass market (Gruber [2005]).
Today, the number of cell phone subscriptions in the U.S. is greater than the U.S.
population and there are nearly 6 billion cell phone subscribers worldwide (cti [2013]).
Over 30% of all U.S. households today are cellular-only according to my data and Macher
72G cell phones used digital waves, and allowed for greater sharing of frequencies.
8The first text message was sent in 1992 (HistoryOfCellPhones.net [2008]).
9This included seamless global roaming with at least 40 times higher signal transmission rates than 2G
systems.
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et al. [2013a]. With this perspective, the history of cell phones shows how the continued
improvement in technology, as well as the decreasing price of cell phones, resulted in a
global phenomenon, which is still changing and improving to this day.
A number of studies have investigated the U.S. telecommunications industry,
many focusing directly on the landline telephone market.10 Garbacz and Thompson Jr
[2003] find that subsidies are costly and ineffective in providing telephony to low-income
households and that decreased costs have been responsible for the increasing market
size. Alleman et al. [2010] examine universal service and argue that universal service
should be defined more broadly as universal connectivity, pointing to the presumption
of substitutability of different communication services.
A number of papers also estimate choice models of demand in the telephony market.
Train et al. [1987] estimate a choice model and conclude that increased rates for measured
service will lead to substitution of consumers to the flat-rate service. Rodini et al. [2003a]
estimate the substitutability of landline and cell phone service in the U.S. using data
from 2000 and 2001. They find that a second landline and a cell phone are substitutes
for consumers with a single landline. They also note that this may change over time as
the services become more comparable. Macher et al. [2013a] estimate a bivariate probit of
household choices using data from 2003 to 2010. The authors also estimate a conditional
logit model and build a framework for a portfolio consumption choice and find that
household characteristics can impact the choice made and that landline and cell phone
services are likely substitutes.
10Miravete [2002] shows that welfare effects are unchanged under different rate implementations in
the demand for local telephone service in the presence of asymmetric information. Economides et al.
[2008] find that firms entering the landline market have positive welfare effects through differentiation
rather than through price. In Bajari et al. [2008], the authors find that “coverage is strongly valued
by consumers, providing an efficiency justication for across-market mergers” in the cell phone service
industry.
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This paper adds to the existing literature on a number of points. I develop a choice
model of households choosing between alternatives and allowing the possibility that cell
and landline phones are substitutes or complements. A key element of the investigation
on the research question is that the data span a much longer period than has been used in
earlier literature. This allows me to examine the evolution of choice over time offering
insight into how this market has evolved and a benchmark for how it may continue
to evolve in the future. Specifically, the extended time frame allows identification of
characteristics that drive the adoption, e.g., prices, preferences, income, etc. In a market
that has changed so rapidly, models that consider the dynamic environment are beneficial
to understanding what is happening in the market. My analysis also includes a mixed logit
model, which avoids the independence of irrelevant alternatives problem and allows for
heterogeneous responses to price (Train [2009]). Finally, I decompose the substitutability
of the two service options by consumer-types and time. The unique data and methods
offer similar findings to previous work, e.g. Macher et al. [2013a], but extend the literature
to examine intertemporal changes by household types.
Model
The model is based on the choices consumer households make with respect to
telephony options. There are four mutually exclusive and exhaustive choices that a
household can make, which are:
itemsep=-4mm No telephone;
iitemsep=-4mm Landline only;
iiitemsep=-4mm Cell phone only; and
ivtemsep=-4mm Cell phone and landline.
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These choices are taken to be the result of utility maximization by households where
utility (Uc) consists of a deterministic component (Vc) and a random component (εc)
where c indexes the options. In order to maximize utility, agents choose option k if and
only if Uk > Uj ∀ k 6= j. However, utility contains a component that is random to the
modeler and is thus modeled as probabilistic. From above, agents choose option k with
probability given by:
P (Uk ≥ Uj) = P (Vk + εk ≥ Vj + εj) = P (εj − εk ≤ Vk − Vj).
The deterministic component, Vc, is taken as a function of individual and household
characteristics, e.g. income, age, etc., as well as price and alternative-specific dummy
variables. Each of the alternatives has unobserved attributes, e.g. convenience, which are
captured by the alternative-specific dummy variables.11 Given the difference in errors is
logistic, the choice probabilities for individual i choosing alternative k at time t are given
by:
Pkit =
eVkit∑J
j=1 e
Vjit
.
I estimate three specifications of the model. It is noteworthy that, as reported in
Section 2.5, the common coefficients are remarkably similar across the three specifications.
My approach is to estimate a model without and with prices and compare the common
coefficients. The CES does not provide direct price information, but allows construction of
prices.12 My first specification is a standard multinomial logit without prices. Given that
prices are constructed, this specification is included for comparison and to assess the use of
11In addition to estimating the three specifications with the full dataset, I estimated them year-by-year.
Most of the coefficients are quite stable through time except the alternative-specific dummy variables,
which have considerable drift with time. For this reason, I include the year trend variable.
12Multiple price variables are constructed from the expenditure data as discussed in Appendix B. My
results are robust to the price construction used; estimates presented here use the algorithmic approach
discussed in the appendix.
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the constructed prices empirically. I then introduce prices for each option and estimate a
conditional logit. My final specification is a mixed logit with a random coefficient on price
using maximum simulated likelihood consistent with Train [2009]; this coefficient is log-
normally distributed. Implementing the mixed logit model ameliorates the independence
of irrelevant alternatives assumption required by other logit specifications, and allows for
heterogeneity in responses to price.13 The choice probabilities for individual i choosing
option k at time t are given by:
Pkit =
∫
Lkit(β)f(β)dβ,
where Lkit(β) is the usual logit formula and f(β) is the continuous probability density
of the parameters, β; this density will be estimated. For the deterministic component of
utility denoted Vkit(β), the usual logit formula is given by:
Lkit(β) =
eVkit(β)∑J
j=1 e
Vkjt(β)
.
In this specification Vkit is taken as a function of individual and household characteristics,
prices, and alternative-specific dummy variables. The alternative-specific conditional logit
specification takes the same general form as the mixed logit specification but enforces the
parameter on prices to be equal across all agents.
13The IIA assumption imposes that, when one option is taken away, there will be proportionate
substitution to the other alternatives, e.g., if the no phone option is removed, IIA holds that the
proportion of those individuals who did choose no-phone but now choose both among those who initially
chose no-phone is equal to the proportion of individuals choosing both among those initially not choosing
no-phone. In this context, I have a classic red bus / blue bus problem (Train [2009]). Those initially
choosing no-phone would be unlikely to choose both, but would instead be more likely to choose either cell
phone or landline in greater proportion than those who did not originally choose no-phone.
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Data and Variables
The data for this project are from the CES conducted by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics on a stratified sample of the United States consumer population.14 This is
an extensive survey that reports characteristics of households and individuals, detailed
expenditure information, and a variety of income measures.15 The CES contains two
elements: a quarterly interview and a diary survey. The interviews are conducted on
each consumer unit (CU) each quarter for five consecutive quarters16 and capture large
or consistent purchases including telephone service. Hence, this element of the survey is
initially used to obtain consumption choices. I then supplement the interview data with
the diary data to uncover choices captured in one, but not the other. To my knowledge,
these data have not been used previously to econometrically examine telephony choices.
Table 1 presents the observed adoption rates by choice and year. During the earliest
years of the sample, more than 90% of households chose landline while not even 4%
chose a cell phone in any manner. As time continued, there was a peak in choosing both
in 2007 when households selected cell phones while maintaining their landline phones.
After this period in the mid-2000s, a decline begins in which the proportion of CUs
choosing landline in any manner decreases. It is likely this trend will continue in future
years as discussed in Section 2.5. The work of Alleman et al. [2010] points to the fact
that telephony exists more broadly in a market for communications rather than for just
telephone services. There are other non-telephone alternatives for communication available
14The stratification of the CES is intended to create representative estimates about consumer spending
at the country-level. For a more detailed explanation of the stratification procedure, see BLS [2008].
15The expenditure information recorded is asked to households in terms of services included in the bill
and is itemized, which allows for individual items on the same bill to be recorded separately. This abates
problems with inappropriately recorded category expenditures that might otherwise be caused by bundled
service offerings.
16The unit of observation is a CU-quarter, although it is possible for a CU to skip an interview quarter.
In addition to estimating the models with all of the observations, I estimated each using only the first
observation of each household. Doing so, I get qualitatively identical and numerically similar results.
14
FIGURE 1. Consumer Choice Shares
to consumers. If a CU has internet access, which may include VOIP or similar internet-
based communications, that CU is still counted as no-phone if it does not subscribe to
either cell phone or landline services. In whole, the early dominant choice of landline
only is the only alternative to decrease over the entire sample such that it is a minority
in 2012. In percentage terms, cell only has the largest gains.17 Figure 1 contains time
trends of household choices observed in the data. From these data I observe that by 2012,
nearly 80% of CUs reported cell phone expenditures. These data are representative of the
population of CUs and are consistent with others, e.g. Macher et al. [2013a].
Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables are provided by choice in Table 2.18
Family Size is the number of members in a CU. Urban is a dummy variable indicating
17Note that for these and all estimation herein, weights are applied to observations to account for the
stratification of the sample.
18I note that, through time, there are modest changes in the format of the questions asked in the survey.
In my particular case, there were no significant changes to the definitions for the variables used.
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TABLE 1. Choices Over Time
Year No Phone Land Only Cell Only Both Total Land or Both Cell or Both
1994 0.83 95.72 0.05 3.40 100.00 99.12 3.45
1995 0.78 92.18 0.09 6.95 100.00 99.13 7.04
1996 1.27 88.45 0.14 10.14 100.00 98.59 10.28
1997 1.34 84.85 0.12 13.69 100.00 98.54 13.81
1998 1.13 82.23 0.22 16.42 100.00 98.65 16.64
1999 1.21 78.56 0.25 19.99 100.00 98.55 20.24
2000 1.15 73.37 0.49 24.99 100.00 98.36 25.48
2001 0.62 60.72 1.07 37.58 100.00 98.31 38.66
2002 0.00 49.31 2.69 48.00 100.00 97.31 50.69
2003 0.00 47.74 4.71 47.55 100.00 95.29 52.26
2004 0.01 46.04 6.80 47.15 100.00 93.19 53.95
2005 0.02 41.69 9.24 49.05 100.00 90.74 58.30
2006 0.02 38.61 12.28 49.09 100.00 87.70 61.37
2007 0.13 32.23 16.38 51.26 100.00 83.50 67.64
2008 0.37 29.93 19.96 49.74 100.00 79.66 69.70
2009 0.27 27.31 23.84 48.59 100.00 75.90 72.42
2010 0.28 23.76 28.51 47.45 100.00 71.21 75.97
2011 0.32 22.88 33.12 43.68 100.00 66.56 76.80
2012 0.32 19.89 36.29 43.49 100.00 63.39 79.78
Overall 0.53 54.50 10.33 34.64 100.00 89.14 44.97
whether a CU is within a metropolitan statistical area (MSA). A value of one indicates
living within an MSA while a value of zero indicates living outside of all MSAs. Real
income is measured in thousands of U.S. Dollars before taxes and is defined by the
variable FINCBTAX in the CES deflated with a gross domestic product price deflator
with base year 2005.19
Many of the characteristics of households are defined by the reference person and
do not consider those characteristics for any other household members. For example, for
a given household, race is defined only by the race of the reference person. The reference
19For the years 2004 and 2005, my measure of income (FINCBTAX) was not available in the CES.
I used an alternative for those years (FINCBTXM) as, for years when both were available, these were
highly correlated. In both cases, the nominal income variable is defined as total before-tax income over
the previous 12 months for the CU including but not limited to salaries, unemployment benefits, business
profits and losses, and retirement.
16
TABLE 2. Variable Means by Choice
Family Size Real Income College Married Urban Male
None 2.32 25.56 0.19 0.32 0.95 0.45
Land 2.40 35.13 0.22 0.49 0.88 0.51
Cell 2.28 36.85 0.27 0.35 0.95 0.52
Both 2.76 61.78 0.36 0.65 0.91 0.51
person is defined as the first member mentioned when asked “Start with the name of the
person or one of the persons who owns or rents the home” (BLS [2008]). Race dummy
variables indicate the race of the reference person: white, black, asian/pacific islander, or
other, which includes native american and multi-race. Age refers to age of the reference
person. Male is a dummy variable for the sex of the reference person. Married is a dummy
variable indicating whether the reference person is currently married. College is a dummy
variable indicating if the reference person has a bachelor’s degree.
A price variable is constructed for each year using the same expenditure data
used to construct the alternative choices for CUs. There are two basic processes, which
suggest similar results. The simpler approach is based on the expenditures of single-
person households in each category. I take the median expenditure on either service among
single-person CUs who have a non-zero expenditure on the service. The other approach
is based on the expenditure of households of every observed size. The basic process
involves estimating the number of phones purchased by a household and then taking a
median price per phone for each household size as in the previous approach. In doing so,
I generate a separate price for each possible family size allowing for discounts from the
purchase of multiple cell phones. For either approach, the price of the both alternative is
the sum of the constructed prices for the individual options. A detailed description of each
approach is presented in Appendix B.20
20For the years for which the data overlap, the correlation coefficient for my constructed price proxies
and the Consumer Price Index categories of landline telephone services and wireless telephone services are
0.8681 and 0.7746, respectively. This supports the constructed prices as effective proxies for price in the
17
Results and Applications
The multinomial logit specification, the alternative-specific conditional logit
specification, and the mixed logit specification discussed in Section 2.3 were estimated
with the data described in Section 2.4. Estimates for the multinomial logit model are
presented and discussed in Section 2.5. These estimates provide a base with which I
compare results from the conditional and mixed logit models, which are presented and
discussed in Section 2.5. These multiple specifications substantiate my price proxy since,
as I discuss below, the parameter estimates for non-price variables are numerically similar
and qualitatively identical across specifications.21 Further discussion and application of the
results are presented in Section 2.5.
Multinomial Logit Estimates
The coefficient estimates for the multinomial logit specification are given in Table 3.
The base option is landline only, so the coefficients can generally be interpreted to imply
greater utility from, although not necessarily substitution to, the alternative relative to
landline for positive coefficients, and less utility from, although not necessarily substitution
from, the alternative relative to landline for negative coefficients. The base category for
dummy variables is a CU living in a rural location with an uneducated, single white
female reference person. Real income, family size, college, married, age, and year are all
choice models. Further, I have estimated my models for the years possible using CPI rather than my price
proxies and get similar results.
21During the time spanned by the data, cell phones and the features available have changed
dramatically creating a heterogeneous product category through time. In addition to the specifications
presented here, I also estimated specifications that include indicators identifying regulatory changes
and cell phone features available in the marketplace. Specifically, I include indicators for the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and availability of text messaging between carriers, 3G and 4G services,
Skype, the iPhone, and third-party smartphone applications. In general, these are not statistically
different from zero. In fact, none are statistically different from zero at the 5% significance level.
Additionally, none of these change the remaining results qualitatively or numerically.
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statistically significant at the 1% significance level for each cell phone alternative. The
year coefficients for all of the cell phone alternatives are positive pointing to a constant
shift through time as cell phone alternatives get better relative to landline for reasons only
explained by the dynamic evolution of the market. Either year fixed-effects or a trend can
capture the dynamic market evolution including service changes and quality, and, having
integrated year fixed-effects into one specification, these follow closely to a linear trend, so
I include the linear trend here.
These results are more easily interpreted by estimating average marginal effects
of explanatory variables on the probabilities. These effects are presented in Table 4. In
general, a marginal effect of 0.01 implies an estimated 1% increase in probability toward
that option for an associated unit-change in the relevant explanatory variable. Summing
marginal effects across alternatives results in a zero value. This is to be expected since the
sum total of probabilities for any given household is always 100% so that any net change
must be zero. The results imply that most of the variables are significant at the 1% level.
One exception is the average marginal effect of urban for the both alternative, which is
only significantly different from zero for the 10% level of significance. Additionally, family
size for no phone is not significant for any standard level of significance. Race dummies
have varying degrees of significance.
Overall, the results in Table 4 point to the fact that demographic characteristics
are important in the choice being modeled. One immediately intuitive result is that
an increase in real income increases the probability of choosing both. As real income
increases, consumers are more able to afford both services rather than either a single
option or neither. Family size has a similar result in that an additional family member
drives the probability toward the both alternative, but also toward landline and away
from cell; however, the largest of these effects is towards both. This is likely driven by the
increased preference for communication since consumers have more people in the family
19
TABLE 3. Multinomial logit
VARIABLES None Cell Both
Constant 38.607** -1049.557*** -415.080***
(15.985) (5.525) (2.290)
Real Income -0.011** -0.003*** 0.004***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Family Size -0.025 -0.217*** 0.018***
(0.025) (0.008) (0.004)
College -0.864*** 0.195*** 0.237***
(0.241) (0.067) (0.036)
Married -0.414*** -0.325*** 0.438***
(0.079) (0.022) (0.012)
Urban 0.718*** 0.550*** 0.081***
(0.144) (0.043) (0.018)
Male -0.138** 0.372*** -0.001
(0.064) (0.018) (0.010)
Black 0.173** -0.284*** -0.133***
(0.080) (0.028) (0.016)
Asian 0.312** 0.001 -0.105***
(0.146) (0.041) (0.025)
Other 0.122 0.299*** 0.050
(0.257) (0.067) (0.043)
Age -0.043*** -0.091*** -0.021***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.000)
Year -0.021*** 0.524*** 0.207***
(0.008) (0.003) (0.001)
Age#Income 0.0001 0.00002*** 0.00009***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age#College 0.017*** -0.006*** 0.003***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.001)
Note: A ***, **, or * indicates significance at the
1, 5,and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard
errors are in parentheses. Landline only is the base
option.
with whom they would like to communicate. I suspect this to be especially true if those
additional family members are children. There are similar effects for being married, and
this is likely driven by the same logic.
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TABLE 4. Multinomial logit, Average Marginal Effects
VARIABLES None Landline Cell Both
Real Income -0.00005*** -0.00117*** -0.00022*** 0.00143***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Family Size -0.00008 0.00235*** -0.01458*** 0.01230***
(0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0007)
College -0.00124*** -0.05499*** -0.01740*** 0.07362***
(0.0003) (0.0020) (0.0012) (0.0022)
Married -0.00244*** -0.05582*** -0.04000*** 0.09825***
(0.0004) (0.0021) (0.0014) (0.0022)
Urban 0.00258*** -0.02525*** 0.02901*** -0.00634*
(0.0004) (0.0032) (0.0022) (0.0033)
Male -0.00080** -0.00779*** 0.02388*** -0.01530***
(0.0003) (0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0018)
Black 0.00119** 0.02489*** -0.01235*** -0.01373***
(0.0005) (0.0026) (0.0015) (0.0027)
Asian 0.00196** 0.01374*** 0.00422 -0.01992***
(0.0010) (0.0041) (0.0025) (0.0042)
Other 0.00047 -0.01460** 0.01783*** -0.00370
(0.0014) (0.0070) (0.0043) (0.0073)
Age -0.00014*** 0.00443*** -0.00493*** 0.00063***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Year -0.00051*** -0.04166*** 0.02490*** 0.01727***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Note: A ***, **, or * indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
level, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Non-urban CUs are more likely to experience different service quality between
alternatives in addition to experiencing larger distance and costs of travel if not using
telephony to communicate. As such, living in an urban environment increases the
probability of having cell phone or no phone. A final point I make here is that, whether or
not a CU chooses landline, they are more likely to choose not cell phone as age increases,
so it is the young households who are driving the shift towards cell phones.
While the marginal effects point to average effects of the explanatory variables
through the sample, another approach to analyze the data is to define consumer profiles
and track their choice probabilities through time. To do so, I consider three distinct
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reference groups as described below and proceed to predict the probabilities of each choice-
alternative for each reference group.22 The groups are:
1. 20-year-old single urban white male living alone with 25th percentile income23 and no
college degree;
2. 40-year-old married urban white male living with 4 others with 75th percentile
income and a college degree; and
3. 75-year-old single urban white female living alone with 50th percentile income and a
college degree.
There are large differences in choice-alternative probabilities between the three reference
groups that are plotted in Figures 2, 3, and 4. The relatively young and poor group
experiences the largest shift towards cell phone only, while the other groups are much less
likely to do so. The household of the middle-aged male is most likely to choose both, a
choice that overtakes landline only around 2001, a switch that happens closer to 2008 for
the retirement-aged female.
22Again, these point to the reference person of a household where these reference groups are households.
23The income percentile refers to percentile in the entire sample of CUs.
22
FIGURE 2. Choice Evolution of Single Urban White Male
FIGURE 3. Choice Evolution of Married Urban White Male
23
FIGURE 4. Choice Evolution of Single Urban White Female
All of the evidence thus far suggests that age of the reference person is an important
factor in the choice model. I plot predicted probabilities by age every 5 years in Figures 5,
6, 7, and 8. This further illustrates the effect of age on the adoption of cell phones through
time initially seen in Table 3 because this estimation procedure allows the marginal effect
of age to vary over time. Younger CUs go from very high probability of landline and
almost zero probability of cell phone to the extreme opposite. The CU of the middle-aged
reference group has stronger adoption of both while those of the older reference group tend
towards landline with very low probability of just cell phone even in 2010.
24
FIGURE 5. Probability by Age, 1995
FIGURE 6. Probability by Age, 2000
25
FIGURE 7. Probability by Age, 2005
FIGURE 8. Probability by Age, 2010
26
Conditional and Mixed Logit Estimates
As pointed to by the significant coefficients on the trend variable in the multinomial
logit results, there may be changes in the unobserved attributes of the underlying
alternatives. In addition, prices have changed dramatically, and may fuel the coefficients
on the trend. Unfortunately, prices are not directly available. However, using the CES
data, I construct measures of alternative prices and in this section, I include these
measures in the specification.24 I estimate two models: an alternative-specific conditional
logit model and a mixed logit model. The results are presented in Table 5 where, again,
landline is the base option. These two specifications produce similar results which are
nearly identical in the sign and significance of the shared coefficient estimates. The
primary differences are the coefficient estimates on the constant, family size, and male.
In each case, one model estimate provides a coefficient that is statistically significant
while the other model estimate provides a coefficient that is statistically zero. Finally,
the coefficient on price in the conditional logit and the mean of the distribution of price
coefficients in the mixed logit are both negative and significant, but are different by two
orders of magnitude. Since the results are similar, I discuss the mixed logit model in the
remainder of this section.25
These results do suggest that increased price negatively impacts utility as expected.
Since the random coefficient is assumed to have a log-normal distribution, it takes on
a negative value for all households. The estimated standard deviation is statistically
significant at all usual levels of significance and somewhat large relative to the mean value
of the coefficient suggesting that there is wide dispersion in the coefficient value among
24The results here use the algorithmic approach to construct a price variable, but similar results are
found using the alternative approach, which is also discussed in Appendix B.
25Of course the conditional logit model may suffer from independence of irrelevant alternatives
assumptions. However the mixed logit does not place this a priori restriction on substitution (Train
[2009]).
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households. This means that the response to prices is different for different households and
points to the mixed logit specification. These results are also very similar to those from
the multinomial logit specification. Again, in comparing the models, the few differences
are entirely accounted for through one model finding a variable statistically zero while the
other model does not.
Heterogeneity in Substitutability
In this section, I have presented the results from multiple specifications of discrete
choice models. One central question to this paper is the substitutability of cell phone and
landline phone alternatives. Gentzkow [2007b] developed a measure of substitutability
that I apply and extend by developing a decomposition that allows me to examine how
characteristics of market segments as well as time affect substitutability.26 My above
results provide enough information to answer this question uniquely for different groups.
Gentzkow [2007b] defines a measure, Γ, as the additional utility from consuming
both options over the sum of utilities from consuming just one of those options. He does
so for physical and online newspaper subscription, but the same measure can be applied to
this market as in Macher et al. [2013a]. That is,
Uboth = Ucell only + Ulandline only + Γ.
Gentzkow [2007b] specifies that this can also be written as
Γ = (Uboth − Ucell)− (ULandline − Uneither).
26I note Macher et al. [2013a] make use of this measure as well, but do not extend or decompose it to
examine heterogeneity in substitutability through time.
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This is the key equation to the application as discussed below and is a useful measure
that provides insight into the substitutability of two goods. For notational convenience,
label the alternatives with A (cell phone), B (landline), AB (both), and N (neither).
Specifically,27
Goods A and B are complements ⇐⇒ Γ > 0
Goods A and B are independent ⇐⇒ Γ = 0
Goods A and B are substitutes ⇐⇒ Γ < 0
Using the definition above, along with the estimates from above, I compute Γ for each of
the reference groups discussed in Section 2.5. Below is the extension in which I decompose
Γ; this consists of a straightforward transformation and simplification of Γ defined above.
Utilities for household i choosing option j are defined by:
Uij = Xiβj + Zijα + εij
where α and β are parameter vectors, Xi is a vector of household characteristics and
alternative-specific dummy variables, Zij is a vector of characteristics that can vary over
alternatives and households, and εij is the usual error. Define deterministic utility by:
Vij = Xiβj + Zijα. Then for some household, i, Γ is given by:
Γi = Ui,AB − Ui,A − Ui,B + Ui,N
= Vi,AB − Vi,A − Vi,B + Vi,N + ε˜
27For a formal proof of the following statements, see Gentzkow (2007).
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where ε˜ is a linear combination of the random components of utilities. Taking expectations
gives
E(Γi) = XiβAB + Zij,ABα−XiβA − Zij,Aα−XiβB − Zij,Bα +XiβN + Zij,Nα
= Xi (βAB − βA − βB + βN) + (Zij,AB − Zij,A − Zij,B + Zij,N)α.
Note that only prices vary by alternative, i.e. Zi = P , and that prices are defined by
PAB ≡ PA + PB such that the sum inside the right parentheses is definitionally zero.
Further, given the base option is normalized such that βB = 0, the expectation reduces to
E(Γi) = Xi (βAB − βA + βN), and therefore, since βΓ ≡ (βAB − βA + βN), the substitution
measure of Gentzkow [2007b] can be decomposed as:
Γ̂i = Xi β̂Γ.
Noting, again, that Xi denotes a vector of household characteristics and alternative-
specific dummy variables and β̂Γ is a linear combination of estimated logit parameters,
an estimate can be computed directly from the existing coefficient estimates. This simple-
to-compute estimator of the Γ parameter varies by individual but not by price. This is
ideal for a measure of substitute goods since price changes do not play a role in their
substitutability, but only drives their substitution. The true parameter illuminates
whether the two goods, A and B, are complement goods or substitute goods. Specifically,
when Γi is positive for household i, A and B are complements; when Γi is negative for
household i, A and B are substitutes. This provides a straightforward interpretation of the
estimate, defined as Γ̂, as well as the source of differences by market segments, βΓ.
First I compute Γ̂i for each reference group in the beginning, middle, and end of the
sample-period using the alternative-specific conditional logit specification estimates. These
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results are presented in Table 6. I find that, at first, two of the three reference groups
view cell phone and landline phone alternatives as complements, but switch by the end
of the sample period. Intuitively, this may be the result of convergence in call quality or
some other explanation through time, e.g. preferences or unobserved alternative-specific
attributes.
TABLE 6. Estimates of Γi for Reference Groups
Group 1994 2003 2012
20 year-old -0.7420 -3.7228 -6.7035
(0.100) (0.086) (0.135)
40 year-old 1.2339 -1.7468 -4.7276
(0.120) (0.119) (0.164)
75 year-old 2.4445 -0.5362 -3.5170
(0.210) (0.200) (0.222)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Γ̂i
constructed with conditional-logit estimates.
I also note that this substitutability measure, Γ, can be decomposed into effects from
underlying sources, which, together, generate the total measure. Indeed, the measure is
a linear combination of parameter estimates, Xi (βAB − βA + βN). By examining these
parameter estimates separately from one another and without the data, I am able to
decompose the substitutability by CU attributes, and I find evidence for heterogeneity
in substitutability by source. These results are presented in Table 7; they suggest that for
an otherwise marginal household, cell and landline phones are complements for households
of older and married individuals with larger families,28 but substitutes for those with male
reference persons, higher incomes, and a college education. Maybe the most interesting
estimate is that of βΓ for the year variable, which implies that, for any given household,
cell and landline phones become more likely substitutes over time based on unobserved
alternative-specific attributes. For policy-makers concerned with substitutability in regard
28This is true for the first two specifications where the mixed logit suggests otherwise.
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TABLE 7. Estimates of βΓ
VARIABLES Multinomial Conditional Mixed
Constant 673.0844*** 659.1784*** 1026.6210***
(16.832) (18.140) (81.900)
Real Income -0.0043 -0.0071 -0.0214
(0.005) (0.005) (0.018)
Family Size 0.2106*** 0.2242*** 0.6542***
(0.026) (0.028) (0.159)
College -0.8214*** -0.6476** -1.8837
(0.249) (0.260) (1.594)
Married 0.3480*** 0.3318*** -0.4643
(0.082) (0.089) (0.538)
Urban 0.2491* 0.2496 2.5858***
(0.150) (0.160) (0.730)
Male -0.5104*** -0.5058*** -0.8343*
(0.066) (0.071) (0.429)
Age 0.0268*** 0.0276*** -0.0363**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.018)
Year -0.3381*** -0.3312*** -0.5231***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.041)
Age#Income 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age#College 0.0260*** 0.0222*** 0.0679*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.039)
Note: A ***, **, or * indicates significance at the 1, 5,
and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors are
in parentheses.
to competition in the market, this points to increasing competition in the landline market
from cell phones.29 Furthermore, my results suggest that substitutability and competition
will continue to evolve in this way in the future.
29Another approach to calculating substitutability is to estimate elasticities. I have simulated changes
in prices and predicted changes in consumption. Doing so points to elasticities, and incrementing a given
variable can simulate the equivalent of βΓ. Doing so provides results qualitatively consistent with those
presented here. Simulated elasticities are available from the author upon request, but are not included
here for length.
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Conclusion
Cell phones have evolved dramatically over the last 20 years. While it was
uncommon to see cell phones at all in the early 1990s, it is seemingly more uncommon to
see someone without a cell phone today. This dramatic evolution points to serious issues
with regard to investment options of service providers and to policy makers. Consumers
make choices to maximize utility based on individual and household attributes, as well as
characteristics of the choice alternatives. In this study, I use this framework to investigate
the change in telephony choices by market segments with the evolution and dramatic
adoption of cell phones.
My results provide evidence about which market segments are driving adoption and
how choice probabilities have evolved. I examined choice over time and found that socio-
demographic variables are important and useful to understanding household-telephony
choices. Most prominently, young households are far more likely to choose cell phones as
an alternative to landline phones while older households or those with larger families are
more likely to choose cell phone in addition to landline phones. It is these groups, younger
and larger CUs, that have driven the massive cell-phone adoption-rates observed in the
data. For all consumer-types, the results display the rapid, and seemingly continued,
adoption of cell phones along with, and in place of, landline phones.
I also provide quantifiable evidence on the policy question as to whether cell
phone and landline services are substitutes. Cell phones can be either a substitute or a
complement to landline phones and the results provide evidence that this differs by market
segment and time. Further, this evidence rationalizes uncertainty from previous literature,
e.g. Rodini et al. [2003a], by accounting for intertemporal changes in substitution;
specifically, where studies using data from different time periods find different results, I
provide evidence that this is expected as substitability has changed through time. This
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is among the most striking features of the results. For any given household and for all
households, it is becoming more likely that these options are substitute goods through
time, suggesting that the landline telephone market, as well as the broader telephony
market, has seen an increase in competition from cell phones, a policy-relevant point in
determining whether continued deregulation of the landline market is warranted through
time.
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CHAPTER III
A BAYESIAN ESTIMATOR FOR TIME-VARYING PARAMETER DISCRETE
CHOICE MODELS: CHANGING DEMAND FOR CHANGING TECHNOLOGY
Introduction
Introduced to the market in 1983, cell phones have changed in form and function at
a rapid pace for more than 30 years. Initially a product that only allowed calling at sky-
high prices, today’s smartphones are priced cheaper, yet do so much more. As such, this
product has a high level of inter-temporal heterogeneity. During the same period, landline
telephones have not seen much technological change. This change between competing
technologies has left a trail of unanswered policy questions in the telephony market. Chief
among these is the regulatory-policy question about how cell phones have impacted the
broader telephony market. The Department of Justice [2008] reports that “The size of
[the] wireless substitution effect is not known...” and “the available evidence does not
establish that mobile services currently represent an effective competitive constraint on
landline access pricing.” These policy questions require timely answers, and markets with
so much change require economic modeling that allows the econometrician to capture the
evolution of products and the ways people use them.
In this paper, I investigate changing consumer preference parameters in evolving
markets showing that changes in competing technologies can affect price sensitivity. As
Engle [2014] states, “in practice, it may be unstable regression coefficients that are most
troubling. Rarely is there credible economic rationale for the assumption that the slope
coefficients are time invariant.” In a discrete choice model, changing slope coefficients
point to changes in preferences, changes in the underlying alternatives, and changes in
utility. Alternatives to explicit modeling of changing preference parameters include the
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application of a trend variable in the specification. This is a simple approach that can
capture some technological change or other dynamic features, but forces a strict form on
the motion of such parameters. Similarly, dummy variables, year fixed effects, and related
interaction terms also force explicit restrictions on the motion of parameters, which are
frequently unmotivated and potentially arbitrary.1 Another approach that also captures
changes between time-periods is splitting the data into separate periods for estimation.
This can show whether some change has occurred between these time periods, but may
not offer insight into why or how the underlying data-generating process is changing.
I develop a flexible methodology that allows the estimation of a large class of models
that extend existing latent dependent-variable and discrete-choice models by allowing
for time-varying parameters. This is something that, to this author’s knowledge, has not
been done in previous literature. Specifically, I adapt the sequential Monte Carlo (SMC)
filtering algorithm of Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez [2004] to compute the
likelihood of preference parameters and parameters governing the motion of preference
parameters. While this may be used for maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), I proceed
using Bayesian econometric methods to estimate these parameters using Markov chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques, which have a few desirable features. First, the SMC
techniques applied to compute the likelihood generate draws for the preference parameters
in each period of the sample as a by-product. MLE does not offer any obvious way to use
these nor does MLE offer any obvious way to estimate the preference parameters for each
year. Alternatively, using Bayesian methods, the yearly draws generated by the SMC filter
can be used to estimate the preference parameters at each period. Bayesian methods also
offer attractive features such as model selection and comparison, and the incorporation of
parameter uncertainty into forecasts.
1That is, there is no form of motion of parameters. The “fixed-effect” for each year is independent of
each other year.
37
Included in the newly-estimable class of models are discrete-choice logit models
with time-varying parameters. I use this model to study change in the telephony market.
Previous research in this market has studied the policy-relevant point of consumer choice
between telephony alternatives; e.g. Train et al. [1987] consider landline access pricing and
Rodini et al. [2003b] explore the substitutability of landlines and cell phones in the early
2000s. Thacker and Wilson [2015] study this issue, also using the Consumer Expenditure
Survey (CES). The authors provide important answers to the policy-relevant questions
posed by the Department of Justice in recent years. I extend the work of Thacker and
Wilson [2015] by allowing for a more flexible model that better fits the data and captures
the evolution of the products and consumers’ preferences over those products. In a
multinomial logit model for which the parameters are over demographic characteristics
of the agents, the parameter values reflect the marginal utility of that demographic
characteristic for the corresponding alternative. As I discuss in Section 3.4, these time-
varying marginal utilities reflect the evolution of the choice-alternatives through time, and,
specifically, relative changes in competing technologies. Maybe more compelling than the
evolution of the product space is the possibility that preferences have shifted based on the
way consumers use and rely on communication technologies. It is clear that technology has
changed, and indeed, I find evidence that consumer demand has changed as well. Bayesian
methods allow for model comparison; comparing the time-varying parameter model to
its constant-parameter sibling, I find the time-varying parameter specification strongly
preferred. Applying this specification, I uncover new insights into the evolution of the
telephony market not detectable with existing methods.
Allowing for time-varying parameters, I find that households’ preference parameters
do vary through time. Specifically, the alternative-specific dummy variables, which capture
the evolution of unobserved product features and technology, move dramatically from
1993 to 2012. Interestingly, consumers also become more sensitive to price. This is likely
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driven by the increasing cell phone service quality, and the ability of consumers to choose
either service rather than needing both. Without time-varying parameters, it is impossible
to capture this change in price sensitivity independent of the technological change. In
addition to the variation of parameters, I explicitly model the process by which those
parameters vary. For some of these parameters, there is strong evidence that a constant
deterministic drift is moving the parameters rather than a simple random walk. This
provides useful insight for forecasting consumer demand in the future of this still-evolving
market for communication technology.
Time-varying parameters provide new insights in the telephony market, but may also
inform deeper understanding of changes underlying other applied models. This framework
might be implemented in foreign direct investment literature to model unobserved changes
in countries’ attractiveness.2 Hazard models in health might implement this framework
to capture cultural and technological changes that may better explain changes in life
expectancy as it increases for all individuals in later generations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents previous literature
relevant to this research and discusses the telephony industry and its continued evolution
through time. Section 3.3 presents the conceptual model on which Section 3.4 builds an
empirical model and estimation methodology. Section 3.5 follows by presenting the data
with which estimation is implemented. The empirical results are presented in Section 3.6
followed by Section 3.7, which concludes.
Background
With the many assumptions made in the empirical economics literature, rarely is it
considered that the parameters may change through time. Standard alternatives include
2See Carlton [1983], Bartik [1985], Coughlin et al. [1991], and Head and Mayer [2004] for examples of
discrete choice models of FDI.
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time-period fixed effects or the inclusion of a trend variable, but this is a fundamentally
different specification than truly time-varying parameters. Previous research develops
methodologies for dealing with such time-varying parameters in other literatures, and
in this paper, I develop a methodology that introduces time-varying parameters into the
discrete-choice literature using a likelihood approach.
The use of time-varying parameters in this paper is motivated by Engle [2014],
which is developed and used in the field of finance and time-series economics. While
Engle [2014] includes a discussion about the assumption of time-invariant parameters,
my methodology takes a different approach to estimation. Engle [2014] estimates a
mean vector and covariance matrix for a time-series vector, (yt, x
′
t)
′ and generalizes the
OLS formulas to include time-varying parameters, but I do not have a time-series, nor a
true panel.3 Doan et al. [1984] implement another time-series model with time-varying
parameters, and like my application, they model parameters as AR(1) processes. Cogley
and Sargent [2005] also implement “drifting coefficients” in the monetary policy literature
noting that a “random walk specification is designed for permanent shifts” in their own
application. This is fitting to the evolution of the telephony industry as well since changes
in technology or culture are likely to represent permanent, rather than transitory, shifts.
This paper introduces a time-varying parameter approach for discrete choice.
While this methodology can be applied to a broader class of models, I use it to extend
Thacker and Wilson [2015] in which the authors investigate household choice between
telephony alternatives and find strong evidence that households are heterogeneous in
substitutability and that substitutability has changed through time. One important
implication of changing substitutability is that other aspects of the model must also be
changing. In the context of telephony, it is obvious that the products themselves have
3It may be possible to generalize Dynamic Conditional Beta to discrete choice with true panel data. I
do not explore that possibility here.
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evolved rapidly and with great consequence. To capture this in the previous work of
Thacker and Wilson [2015], the authors include a trend variable that captures linear
changes in the alternative-specific characteristics of the alternatives, which captures a
significant amount of intertemporal product heterogeneity. A more flexible methodology
can capture more variation in the evolution of alternative-specific characteristics. I use this
methodology to estimate a model of the evolution of choices using revealed prefence data
that span a 19-year period.
The first cell phone was invented in 1973; the first commercially-available cell phone
entered the US telephony market in 1983 (Gruber [2005]). During the same time, the
Department of Justice forced the divestiture of AT&T’s landline operations by 1984.
These changes initiated dramatic shifts in the market for telephone services. Cell phone
devices have evolved tremendously since their market introduction; the original cell phone
was expensive, and could make phone calls, but today, cell phones have evolved into
smartphones that can access the full Internet including email, social media, geographic
navigation, games, and more. Smartphones are even poised to replace cash and credit
cards as a primary method of payment. Train et al. [1987] investigate substitution of
consumers between different pricing schemes for landline service. Estimating a discrete
choice model, the authors’ results suggest that changes in rates among options will cause
substitution. In a related paper, Macher et al. [2013b] develop a theoretical model that
seeks to explain household choice between cell and landline phones, and then estimate
choice models with data over an 8-year period of the 2000s. Results from their research
suggest that landlines and cell phones are substitutes and that choices depend on
household attributes. For a more complete review of the rapid and impressive evolution
of the telephony market since the 1980s, and an extended review of existing literature, see
Thacker and Wilson [2015].
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Previous research in a variety of fields has focused on discrete choice for which
agents make decisions in a dynamic environment through solving a dynamic programming
problem. The seminal work of Rust [1987] develops a model of the dynamic decision
process of Harold Zurcher, who decides when to replace GMC bus engines for the Madison
Metropolitan Bus Company. The work of Hotz and Miller [1993] develops a method that
makes estimation of the structural parameters of discrete choice dynamic programming
problems less computationally burdensome and apply this method to a dynamic model of
parental contraceptive choice. Additionally, Gowrisankaran and Rysman [2009] develop
and estimate a dynamic model of consumer choice for new durable goods. For further
review of the dynamic discrete choice literature, see Aguirregabiria and Mira [2010]. I do
not observe a panel of choices being made through time by the same agents; however, the
methods that I develop may be fruitful in this context as well.
Conceptual Framework
Households can choose whether to consume each alternative; specifically, an agent
can choose to consume one of four mutually exclusive alternatives: (1) landline, (2) cell
phone, (3) both cell phone and landline, or (4) no telephone service. They make choices
to maximize their utility. Specifically, I implement the random-utility model of discrete
choice such that utility contains a deterministic component and a random component. In
the most general case, household i receives utility from alternative j during time-period t
given by:
Uijt = Vijt + ijt = Xitβ
X
ijt + Zjtβ
Z
ijt + ijt
where Vijt is the deterministic component of utility, Xit are household attributes, which
may change over time, Zjt are alternative-specific attributes, which may also change over
time, βXit and β
Z
jt are the effects of those on utility, respectively, and ijt is the random
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component of utility distributed type-I extreme value. This distributional assumption is
consistent with the usual class of discrete choice logit models.
The utility gained from each alternative depends on the underlying attributes
of that alternative. These attributes are present in Zjt, but unobserved attributes are
also reflected in the parameter values over the household characteristics, βXit , which
describe the heterogeneity in preferences by household type. As the products and their
underlying attributes evolve through time, these parameters must also change. In addition,
the preferences of the market participants over product attributes may evolve further
suggesting that parameters vary through time. The latter point explains why βZijt varies
through time, and both illustrate why βXijt varies through time. To model this, the usual
logit model is implemented as the measurement equation of a state-space model, and the
parameter values act as the state variables, evolving according to the transition equation.
The state-space representation of this evolutionary discrete choice model takes the
following form based on the specification described above:
Yit = argmax
j∈J
{
Uijt = Xitβ
X
ijt + Zjtβ
Z
it + ijt
}
(3.1)
βXijt
βZit
 =
f(Ωt−1)
g(Ωt−1)
+
ωXijt
ωZit
 . (3.2)
Equation 3.1 is the measurement equation for a given time-period.4 Equation 3.2 is
the random state transition equation for the parameters. Yit is the observed dependent
variable; that is, it is the utility-maximizing alternative chosen by the household, while
Uijt is the latent dependent-variable representing the household’s utility specific to each
alternative, j. Ωt−1 represents data from time-period t− 1 or earlier as well as lagged
4Here, I represent the discrete-choice logit model, but the method I develop is general enough to handle
other discrete choice models as well.
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state-variables, i.e. lagged preference parameters of the measurement equation. Here,
f(·) and g(·) are the deterministic functions that, in part, determine the outcome of those
parameters, and ωXijt and ω
Z
it are additively separable random shocks to those parameters.
At this stage, it is not necessary to make this assumption of additive-separability of
the random and deterministic components in the transition equation, but I do so for
expositional simplicity. More generally, this framework offers a flexible form for the
transition equation; it may be linear or non-linear, and may, conditional on identification,
contain a variety of random or non-random components. Note that it is possible to rewrite
the measurement equation to include many non-random components that might otherwise
be added to the transition equation, e.g. using interactions in the measurement equation.
Estimation Methodology
To estimate this model requires a methodology that allows for the unobserved state-
variables of the transition equation, the possible non-linearity of the transition equation,
the non-Gaussian error in the measurement equation, and the latent dependent-variable of
the measurement equation. To accomplish this, I adapt the SMC algorithm of Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez [2004] to compute the value of the likelihood function.
This likelihood value may then be used for Bayesian estimation via MCMC techniques
or frequentist estimation via MLE. To take advantage of the relevant benefits of Bayesian
estimation for the purpose of this paper, most notably the ability to estimate preference
parameters for each time period, I implement the Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm
and proceed with estimation via MCMC.
Estimating the model requires a functional form for the measurement and transition
equations. The measurement equation takes a typical logit framework where Xit consists
of household characteristics and alternative-specific dummy variables and Zjt is price.
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Additionally, the parameters, i.e. βXijt and β
Z
it , do not vary by individual.
5 The functional
form of the transition equations for each parameter is an AR(1) process, a random walk
with drift. That is, a parameter value depends only on its value in the previous period,
a deterministic drift, and a random component, and these components are additively
separable. Thus, for some parameter of the measurement equation, β¯, the transition
equation is given by:
β¯t = β¯t−1 + τ¯ + ωt, ω ∼ N(0, σ¯2) (3.3)
for some constant drift, τ¯ , and some standard deviation, σ¯.
MCMC Procedure
Bayesian estimation of this model involves estimating the posterior distribution of
the parameter values. Specifically, I am estimating:
p (θ | Y ) = p(Y |θ)p(θ)
p(Y )
θ =
{{{
βkj0, τjk, σjk
}K
k=1
}J
j=2
, βP0 , τP , σP
}
where P (θ | Y ) is the posterior distribution to be estimated, P (Y |θ) is the likelihood
function, P (Y ) is the prior distribution, θ is the set of estimable parameters, Y represents
the data, σs are the standard deviations of the shocks to the transition equation, and βs
are initial values of the preference parameters.6
5Mixing coefficients are possible, but are currently computationally infeasible. See appendix C for
further computational notes.
6Although I do not formally estimate preference parameters in each period as elements of θ, Bayesian
econometric methods allow the draws generated by the SMC algorithm of Section 3.4 to be captured to
produce estimates of these parameters in each period. Again, MLE would use the likelihood to complete
estimation of θ, but would not produce these yearly estimates.
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One of the standard methods for estimating the posterior distribution is to draw
from it using MCMC techniques such as MH. I do so here. The basic premise of the
algorithm is to draw a value for the parameters, evaluate it relative to the previous draw,
and either accept or reject this value with probability α, as defined below. Doing so allows
estimation of the posterior through simulation. Explicitly, the MH algorithm is given as
follows.
1. Begin with a proposed value of the parameters, θg−1. For the first draw, g = 1, this
is some initial value, θ0.
2. Draw a new value for the parameters, θ∗, from the proposal distribution, h(·|θg−1).
3. Compute the MH acceptance probability of the proposal conditional on the previous
draw, θg−1, by:
α =
p(Y |θ∗)p(θ∗)h(θg−1|θ∗)
p(Y |θg−1)p(θg−1)h(θ∗|θg−1) (3.4)
4. Set θg equal to θ
∗ with probability α; set θg equal to θg−1 otherwise.
5. Return to step 2 of the algorithm for g = g + 1 and repeat until g = G where G is
the maximum number of draws.
This is the standard MH technique for drawing from the unknown posterior distribution,
p(θ|Y ). For further details about the process see Koop [2003]. To estimate the posterior
using this technique requires computation of the distributions in the acceptance
probability. Specifically, one must be able to compute the likelihood, p(Y |θ), for the
proposal and the previous draw, as well as the probability density of the prior distribution
at each of these values, p(θ), and the probability density of the proposal distribution for
one draw conditional on another, h(θ|θ˙).
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Computation of the prior and proposal densities are straightforward. However,
computation of the likelihood function is not straightforward due to the structure of the
model; a filtering process is necessary to calculate the likelihood of a draw of θ.
Estimating the Likelihood Function
The SMC algorithm of Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez [2004] allows
estimation of the likelihood function for nonlinear, intertemporal models, as is this model,
but must be adapted to allow for the latent dependent-variable in the measurement
equation of such discrete-choice models. To this author’s knowledge, this has not been
done by previous research. Furthermore, this approach provides a method that allows
time-varying-parameters to be estimated using Bayesian methods or MLE. I proceed with
the Bayesian methodology described above.
The SMC filtering algorithm estimates the value of the likelihood function as follows:
1. Set the number of particles, D, equal to a large number;
2. Take D draws of ω from the assumed distribution of equation 3.3 for each time-
varying parameter;
3. Use each of these draws to calculate parameter values for the period, βdt , according
to the transition equation and the values of the previous period;
4. Construct weights for each drawn particle based on the likelihood of the data from
the period conditional on the particle’s simulated parameter values:
γdt =
p(Yt|βdt )
D∑
l=1
p(Yt|βlt)
;
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5. Redraw D draws with replacement from the original set of parameter-value draws,
βdt , using weights given by γ
d
t . Denote these redrawn parameter values for the period
by βˆdt ;
6. Return to step 2 using the redrawn parameter values, βˆdt , as the previous period
values in step 3 and repeat for the next period until reaching the end of the sample;
7. Upon reaching the end of the sample, compute the likelihood by:
p(Y |θg) =
T∏
t=1
1
D
D∑
d=1
p(Yt|βˆdt ). (3.5)
Step 4 of the SMC algorithm contains the primary adaptation necessary for discrete
choice. Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez [2004] assume measured data on the
left-hand side of the measurement equation. Other latent dependent-variable models that
can be estimated year-by-year can also use this procedure by computing the likelihood
function for that year as the likelihood, p(Yt|βdt ) in construction of the weights in step 4.
For the logit model presented here, this is given by the usual logit formula. Specifically,
p(Yt|βdt ) =
Nt∏
i=1
exp(Uijt)
J∑
m=1
exp(Uimt)
where Nt is the number of observed choice occasions in time-period t and J is the number
of available alternatives.7 However, a variety of discrete-choice models may be estimated
with time-varying parameters in this same way. Finally, note that the draws of βˆdt are
those that I use to estimate the preference parameters at each period in time.
7I normalize utility constant at zero for some base alternative. This is implicit in the likelihood so that
Uijt = 0 ∀ i, t for that base alternative.
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Prior Distribution
The prior distribution, P (θ), is the probability distribution over the parameters that
does not include information from the data; this distribution is required for Bayesian
analysis. For a variety of reasons, I implement a diffuse prior distribution that has little
impact on the estimation procedure. These priors are listed for all of the estimated
parameters, θ, in Table8. Specifically, I use dispersed normal distributions centered at
zero for all parameters that can take on positive or negative values. For some parameter,
β̂, that can take on positive or negative values, the prior distribution is given by
β̂ ∼ N(0, 10)
such that each parameter prior is independent. For all parameters that cannot take on
negative values, e.g. standard deviations, I use a gamma distribution with large dispersion.
For some parameter, σ̂, that cannot take on negative values, the prior distribution is given
by
σ̂ ∼ Γ(1.5, 40)
such that each parameter prior is independent. For parameters that can only take negative
values, the prior is simply the negative of this gamma distribution; specifically, my prior
includes only negative values on the marginal utility of price, βZit .
As stated above, there are multiple reasons for such diffuse priors. The primary
reason for this is that logit models do not produce results that are easily interpreted
on their own. Where some AR(1) processes might provide intuition such that the
econometrician has a prior that a coefficient will be close to one and greater than zero,
the parameters of the logit model do not provide straightforward intuition to guide a less
diffuse prior. Further, the magnitude of logit parameters depends in part on the amount
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TABLE 8. Prior Distributions for θ
ALT. VARIABLE PARAMETER Distribution
Price β1993 N(0, 10)
σω Γ(1.5, 40)
τ N(0, 10)
Cell Constant β1993 N(0, 10)
σω Γ(1.5, 40)
τ N(0, 10)
Cell Age β1993 N(0, 10)
σω Γ(1.5, 40)
τ N(0, 10)
Cell Family Size β1993 N(0, 10)
σω Γ(1.5, 40)
τ N(0, 10)
Both Constant β1993 N(0, 10)
σω Γ(1.5, 40)
τ N(0, 10)
Both Age β1993 N(0, 10)
σω Γ(1.5, 40)
τ N(0, 10)
Both Family Size β1993 N(0, 10)
σω Γ(1.5, 40)
τ N(0, 10)
of variation the model explains, so a prior with no information from the data cannot be
excessively restrictive. Finally, a diffuse prior will let the data drive the estimation. To
this point, the log-likelihoods calculated using the algorithm presented in Section 3.4 are
extremely large in magnitude relative to the priors presented here. Thus, because I have a
large dataset, even precise priors do not impact the estimation procedure in a meaningful
way.
Proposal Distribution
The final distribution that must be addressed to carry out MH is the proposal
distribution. To sample the posterior distribution in general, the ideal proposal is a
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random-walk proposal distribution such that
θg ∼ N(θg−1, κΣP (θ|Y ))
where θg−1 is the previous draw, κ is a positive scalar, and ΣP (θ|Y ) is the true covariance
matrix of the posterior distribution, P (θ|Y ). For this estimation routine, I use κ equal to
2.4, as is suggested in Haario et al. [2005] for their application; this provides a satisfactory
acceptance rate for my application. Given that the true posterior cannot be known during
estimation of the posterior, I follow Haario et al. [2005] and implement single-component
adaptive Metropolis (SCAM). This is an adaptive proposal that uses the variance of each
parameter in the simulated posterior up to draw g to approximate the true posterior
covariance matrix. This does cause MH to not be truly Markovian, but as discussed in
Haario et al. [2005], this does not impact the properties of the estimation routine.8
One alternative to SCAM is adaptive metropolis (AM) of Haario et al. [2001]. This
is a similar proposal but estimates the full covariance matrix of the simulated posterior
up to draw g. Computing the full covariance matrix each draw is computationally taxing,
so SCAM is implemented as a next-best alternative. Specifically, the variance of the kth
individual parameter can be updated after each draw according to
Σ̂kg+1 =
g − 1
g
Σ̂kg + (θ
k
g−1)
2 +
1
g
(θkg )
2 − g + 1
g
(θ
k
g)
2
where g is the number of the most recent draw, Σ̂kg is the k
th diagonal element of the
simulated ΣP (θ|Y ) up to draw g, and θ
k
g is the k
th element of the mean vector of the
simulated posterior distribution up to the gth draw. This is computationally convenient
and allows for more efficient sampling of the posterior.
8Most notably, it is still ergodic.
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Finally, note that the proposal distribution is symmetric. This allows me to
simplify the acceptance probability of the MH algorithm descibed in Section 3.4. I do
so by cancelling out the symmetric, and therefore equal, proposal distribution from the
numerator and denominator.
Data
The data for this application come from the CES conducted by the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics. This is an extensive survey that asks households for expenditure
information. Specifically, the CES provides expenditure information for a given household
from both a quarterly interview and a daily diary over a 5-quarter period. In this
application, the expenditure information is used to infer consumption choices.9 In addition
to these expenditures, the households provide a wide variety of demographic information
including number of household members, age, sex, a variety of income measures, etc. The
detailed expenditure information also allows construction of price measures as in Thacker
and Wilson [2015]. I use this same price measure here, and include this in the model of
the discrete choice decision process. Specifically, the variables used in this estimation
procedure are age of the reference person, the number of individuals in the household,
and alternative specific dummy variables.10 Many of the CES variables, as mentioned, are
defined for the reference person. This is the first person mentioned when respondents are
asked who owns or leases the living space. Generally, this can be considered the head of
the household. Summary statistics of key demographic variables from the final dataset are
presented in Table 9.
9In estimation with these data, the no-telephone alternative is dropped. So few households choose
no-telephone that including this low-cell-count choice does not add information, but detracts from the
estimation of the other choice alternatives.
10In previous work (i.e. Thacker and Wilson [2015]), multiple specifications were considered and
estimated, and the results were numerically similar and qualitatively equivalent.
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TABLE 9. Variable Means by Choice
Family Size Age Real Income Married Urban Male
None 2.32 38.78 25.56 0.32 0.95 0.45
Land 2.40 50.66 35.13 0.49 0.88 0.51
Cell 2.28 36.99 36.85 0.35 0.95 0.52
Both 2.76 48.17 61.78 0.65 0.91 0.51
The data are available for years 1994 to 2012. Despite the category being included in
the CES dating as far back as the 1980s, all entries in the cell phone expenditure category
are zero prior to 1994. One of the strongest features of this dataset is the expansive time-
period over which it has been collected. To this author’s knowledge, the longest period
of time covered by other datasets used in telephony research has been less than a decade.
For a dynamic model of market evolution such as this one, this feature of the data is ideal.
Although these data are for multiple households and over 19 years, it is not a true panel,
in that many households appear only one time and none appear for more than 5 quarters.
In total, I observe just over 296,000 individual choice occasions over the course of this 19-
year period. Choice shares between telephony alternatives are presented in Table 10.
Results and Applications
The time-varying parameter, multinomial logit presented in Section 3.3 was
estimated with the methodology presented in Section 3.4 and the data described
in Section 3.5 using the University of Oregon’s Applied Computational Instrument
for Scientific Synthesis (ACISS).11 In this estimation, included in the model are
alternative specific dummy variables, price, age, and family size. Due to the low number
of observations, the no-phone alternative was dropped from the analysis and those
households choosing that alternative were removed from the data. Additional tables are
11See Appendix C for discussion of the computational burden of these methods.
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TABLE 10. Consumer Choice Shares Over Time
Year No Phone Land Only Cell Only Both Total Land or Both Cell or Both
1994 0.83 95.72 0.05 3.40 100.00 99.12 3.45
1995 0.78 92.18 0.09 6.95 100.00 99.13 7.04
1996 1.27 88.45 0.14 10.14 100.00 98.59 10.28
1997 1.34 84.85 0.12 13.69 100.00 98.54 13.81
1998 1.13 82.23 0.22 16.42 100.00 98.65 16.64
1999 1.21 78.56 0.25 19.99 100.00 98.55 20.24
2000 1.15 73.37 0.49 24.99 100.00 98.36 25.48
2001 0.62 60.72 1.07 37.58 100.00 98.31 38.66
2002 0.00 49.31 2.69 48.00 100.00 97.31 50.69
2003 0.00 47.74 4.71 47.55 100.00 95.29 52.26
2004 0.01 46.04 6.80 47.15 100.00 93.19 53.95
2005 0.02 41.69 9.24 49.05 100.00 90.74 58.30
2006 0.02 38.61 12.28 49.09 100.00 87.70 61.37
2007 0.13 32.23 16.38 51.26 100.00 83.50 67.64
2008 0.37 29.93 19.96 49.74 100.00 79.66 69.70
2009 0.27 27.31 23.84 48.59 100.00 75.90 72.42
2010 0.28 23.76 28.51 47.45 100.00 71.21 75.97
2011 0.32 22.88 33.12 43.68 100.00 66.56 76.80
2012 0.32 19.89 36.29 43.49 100.00 63.39 79.78
Overall 0.53 54.50 10.33 34.64 100.00 89.14 44.97
provided in the appendices of this paper; additional tables are provided in Appendix D.12
Key results and the most important tables and figures are presented below.
Price Sensitivity
The prior distribution for the initial value of the coefficient on price is negative, so
that it must be strictly negative. Through time, the coefficient on price decreases from
a posterior median of -2.25 in 1994 to a posterior median of -16.6 in 2012. The increase
in magnitude of this negative coefficient suggests that consumers’ utilities become more
sensitive to price through time. With an average price of service equal to approximately
$42 for either single-choice alternative (i.e. not both), this points to the increasing
12Additional figures are available from the author by request.
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importance of price. As may be expected, without consideration of price, most households
would get the highest utility from the both alternative, especially by 2012. However, the
considerable difference in cost for the both alternative is responsible for driving utility
down in later years when households tend to choose cell phone only more frequently than
other alternatives. This is captured by the increasing magnitude of the price coefficient.
This is likely driven by the fact that cell phone services become more reliable through
the sample, decreasing the need for landlines to have reliable telephone services in the
home. This allows consumer households to be more sensitive to price because the products
become more substitutable so that they do not require the most expensive alternative of
selecting both services.
TABLE 11. Deterministic Utility for a Median Household
Alternative (1) (2) (3)
Landline Only 0 0 0
Cell Only -1543.7 160.37 78.09
Both -618.329 386.153 56.353
To illustrate this point, consider the median household in these data: a household
with two members and reference person aged 46 years old. The deterministic component
of utility for each alternative is presented in Table 11 for this household under three
different parameter specifications.13 First are the median parameter estimates for 1994;
the second are the median parameter estimates for 2012 except the coefficient on price,
which remains at the 1994 estimate; the final column uses median estimates for 2012,
including the price coefficient. Note that in 1994, virtually all households of this type
choose landline. If non-price utility, i.e. the alternative-specific dummies and demographic-
specific coefficients, changed in the same way that is observed but consumers’ disutility
13Utility determines the choice probabilities according to the standard logit formula,
P (Yit = j) =
exp(Uijt)
J∑
m=1
exp(Uimt)
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FIGURE 9. Price Coefficient Through Time
from price remained the same, virtually all households of this type would choose landlines
as well as cell phones. When the price coefficient changes to be as it is estimated, this
flips, and virtually all households of this type choose cell phone only. Thus, even though
technological and cultural changes have been crucial for the adoption of cell phones, it is
this increased disutility from price that drives households away from landlines, thereby
providing an effective competitive constraint on landline pricing.
The posterior distribution suggests that random noise in the price coefficient’s
transition equation, rather than deterministic drift, is most supported by the data. That
is, the increase in sensitivity to price through time is not deterministically driven in the
transition equation. The running mean plots appear to level off around draw 40,000,
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FIGURE 10. Cell Constant Coefficient Through Time
but they continue to move around to some degree. This is driven by the high level of
autocorrelation between draws, which can be seen in the associated autocorrelation
functions. For instance, the most dramatic, and unyielding autocorrelation is that of
σpriceω , which is still above 0.4 at 4,000 lags. Even if convergence is reached, this correlation
pulls the mean in different directions for short periods. Fortunately, as more draws are
taken, the adaptive MH algorithm is able to minimize this effect through a more efficient
proposal distribution; an adaptive proposal is exceptionally well suited to cases with many
parameters for this reason.
Non-Price Parameters
Some parameters of the utility function do not appear to move substantially through
time; however, the most striking movement of parameters is that of the alternative-specific
dummy variables. For example, the coefficient on the cell-phone-only alternative-specific
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TABLE 12. Posterior Distributions for βt, 1994 and 2012
ALT. VARIABLE Year 5th-tile 25th-tile Median 75th-tile 95th-tile StdDev
Price 1994 -3.87 -2.92 -2.25 -1.66 -1.13 0.63
2012 -26.84 -21.15 -16.60 -12.93 -9.47 4.11
Cell Constant 1994 -147.07 -90.63 -51.05 -11.73 31.61 39.45
2012 309.64 369.27 424.68 480.66 539.00 55.69
Cell Age 1994 -41.29 -34.74 -29.26 -23.90 -17.57 5.42
2012 -4.09 -3.36 -2.75 -2.16 -1.58 0.60
Cell Family Size 1994 -75.27 -47.04 -24.40 -1.60 22.25 22.72
2012 -22.77 -15.82 -9.66 -3.39 3.29 6.21
Both Constant 1994 38.12 58.89 82.09 103.88 124.77 22.49
2012 574.55 731.57 900.57 1112.78 1385.08 190.61
Both Age 1994 -3.33 -1.92 -0.85 -0.26 0.12 0.83
2012 -1.89 -1.36 -0.90 -0.46 0.02 0.45
Both Family Size 1994 -3.12 0.42 3.57 7.99 14.24 3.79
2012 -9.97 -4.25 1.19 6.69 12.67 5.47
dummy variable starts off at -51.05, but increases through time to a posterior median of
424.68 by 2012. This points to increasing utility from the cell phone alternative relative
to landline. In fact, this evolution and change in products and technology is one of the
motivating ideas behind the development of this estimation procedure. A median value
of 424.68 in 2012, up from -51.05 in 1994, represents results that are both empirically
interesting and economically relevant. Relative to the magnitude of utility in these choice
models, those values represent massive swings in utility for households from 1994 to 2012.
Now consider the coefficient on the alternative-specific dummy variable for the both
alternative. Again there are economically significant changes through time. Indeed, the
5th percentile of the posterior distribution for τ on this parameter is positive, and the
median for this drift parameter is 53. Yet again, this points to the increasing utility of cell
and landline phones relative to the landline-only alternative. The increasing technologies
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FIGURE 11. Cell Age Coefficient Through Time
FIGURE 12. Cell Family Size Coefficient Through Time
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and product-quality in the cell phone market are providing economically important utility
gains to consumers whether or not a household has a landline telephone.
The remaining coefficients for the cell-only alternative move less substantially. For
instance, the coefficient for age on the cell-only alternative increases from a median of -29
in 1994 to a median above -4 by 2001 and then remains fairly constant until the end of the
sample. A negative coefficient on this variable implies decreased utility from cell phone
relative to landline for older households. This is consistent with younger households being
disposed to adopting new technology in earlier years, with this effect dissipating through
time, but remaining present to a lesser magnitude through the rest of the sample. The
oldest households, indeed, receive the highest relative utility from landline-only among
otherwise equivalent households. Similarly, the coefficient on family size for the cell phone
alternative is nearly constant through time, although the median is negative for all years
in the sample. This points to larger households getting relatively more utility from the
landline alternative than otherwise equivalent households. This is consistent with the
notion that larger households receive more utility from a landline because more people can
use a landline than a cell phone, which may travel with a single person in the household.14
Also, the posterior distribution of drift, τ , for both of these parameters is mostly positive,
pointing to a deterministic drift in the direction of diminishing these effects.
One interesting feature of this estimation procedure is the magnitude of variation
in the posterior distribution through time. For instance, in the figures of cell-phone-
alternative coefficients, the spread of the included central posterior intervals decreases
14This does not suggest that these households get more utility from landline only, but rather that these
households receive less utility from cell phones, relative to landlines, than do smaller households.
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FIGURE 13. Both Constant Coefficient Through Time
FIGURE 14. Both Age Coefficient Through Time
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FIGURE 15. Both Family Size Coefficient Through Time
through time. This is driven by the relative frequency of households choosing this
alternative at different periods of time. In early years, fewer households choose only cell
phone, and so the data provide less certainty about the coefficients for that alternative.
In terms of the posterior, which may be thought to represent our uncertainty about the
value of the parameters, this emerges as larger posterior variance, which can be seen in the
figures plotting parameters through time. Similarly, the number of households choosing
the both alternative reaches its maximum near the center of the data, and so there is
greater uncertainty for these coefficients toward the beginning and end than in the middle
of the sample-period.
For the both alternative, the posterior median is negative in all years, but
economically small relative to the alternative specific dummy variables, which play
an economically significant role in household utility. Households of older consumers
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will receive less utility from the both alternative relative to landline than will younger
households. Additionally, this effect is relatively constant through time. As with older
versus younger households, the size of a household has economically small impact on
utility for the both alternative relative to landline. The posterior median for the both
alternative, family-size coefficient is positive for all years except 1996 when it is -0.035.
Model Comparison
One of the benefits of Bayesian estimation is a straightforward approach to
comparing models. Specifically, Bayesian model comparison uses the marginal likelihood of
each model to determine posterior model probabilities. These probabilities are generated
by the following formula:
Pr(Mi|Y ) = f(Y |Mi)Pr(Mi)Υ∑
υ=1
f(Y |Mυ)Pr(Mυ)
∀ i = 1, . . . ,Υ
where Pr(Mi|Y ) is the posterior model probability for the model denoted Mi given data
denoted Y , Pr(Mi) is the prior model probability, Υ is the number of models considered,
and f(Y |Mi) is the marginal likelihood, or the average fit of the model. While this
technique can also be used for model averaging, I use it to determine whether a time-
varying parameter specification better fits the data. While the random-walk time-varying
parameter specification is more flexible, it is not the case that this approach necessarily
chooses the more flexible model. Specifically, this approach penalizes a model with
more parameters through the prior distributions; the prior distribution over a group of
parameters has a lower average value when there are more parameters in that set. This
penalty acts against this time-varying parameter specification because it has many more
parameters, and so it is only preferred when the likelihood function is substantially higher.
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This enters the posterior model probability through the marginal likelihood:
f(Y |Mi) =
∫
p(Y |θ,Mi)p(θ|Mi)dθ
where θ denotes the parameters of the model and p(Y |θ) and p(θ) are the likelihood and
prior probability distributions as in Section 3.4.
I use this framework to compare the specification of this paper to two other
specifications. The first alternate specification has no consideration of time; parameters
are constant, but utility is of the same form as the specification in this paper. The second
alternate specification uses time trends; parameters are still constant, but in addition to
the primary specification of utility in this paper, utility also has alternative-specific trend
variables. To summarize:
Yit = argmax
j∈J
{
Uijt = Xitβ
X
ijt + Zjtβ
Z
it + ijt
}
β¯t = β¯t−1 + τ¯ + ωt, ω ∼ N(0, σ¯2) (Model 1)
Yit = argmax
j∈J
{
Uijt = Xitβ
X
ijt + Zjtβ
Z
it + ijt
}
β¯t = β¯t−1 (Model 2)
Yit = argmax
j∈J
{
Uijt = Xitβ
X
ijt + Zjtβ
Z
it + Y EARtβ
yr
ijt + ijt
}
β¯t = β¯t−1 (Model 3)
where β¯ represents each parameter of the measurement equation.
TABLE 13. Model Comparison
Pr(Mi) log(f(Y |Mi)) Pr(Mi|Y )
Model 1 0.333 -18,055.711 1
Model 2 0.333 -160,498.511 0
Model 3 0.333 -111,332.896 0
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The results are presented in Table 13. Given equal prior probability to each of the
models, the posterior model probabilities favor the time-varying parameter specification
by a large margin. In fact, given any reasonable prior distribution over the models, the
marginal likelihoods are such that the posterior will virtually always favor the time-
varying parameter specification.
Conclusion
This paper set out to study consumer choice through time in a market with
tremendous change in the product space. To do so, I implement the random-utility
framework and, specifically, the logit class of discrete choice models. With SMC filtering
techniques, I extend this, and the broader class of discrete-choice models, to allow for
time-varying parameters. Finally, I implement this model using data over a 19-year period,
during which most of the adoption of cell phones took place.
This new estimation methodology along with the use of Bayesian econometric
techniques, provides a variety of contributions to the literature. Foremost, these techniques
allow for the inclusion of time-varying parameters in the wide class of models with latent
dependent variables. As authors such as Engle [2014] have suggested, the assumption of
constant parameter values is one that is rarely questioned; techniques that allow for such
generalizations provide alternatives to this assumption. Bayesian techniques, in addition
to providing useful tools such as inclusion of prior knowledge and model selection, allow
estimation of the parameters of the measurement equation in each time-period. That is,
with this estimation strategy, it is possible to estimate the parameters of discrete-choice
models in every period when those parameters change in each of those periods.
Importantly, I have learned more about the motivating problem in addition to the
methodological contribution. By allowing the parameters to vary randomly through time,
I have estimated the transition equation, which governs the movement of the parameters.
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In this way, it is clear that some of these parameters vary more randomly, while others
have deterministic movement in the form of drift. This provides insight to forecasting
future changes. For instance, the drift parameters of the transition equation for the
coefficients on family size and age for the cell-only alternative point to decreased negative
impact on utility from these household characteristics in the future. The strongest of these
is, of course, the alternative-specific dummy variable for the both alternative capturing
the increased utility through time from changes in technology. From a descriptive, rather
than forecasting, perspective, this has also provided useful detail about the change in
sensitivity to price in this market through time. For regulatory policy, this supports the
argument that cell phones do provide an effective competitive constraint on price for
landline services.
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CHAPTER IV
A DYNAMIC MODEL OF OLIGOPOLISTIC COMPETITION WITH SUPPLY-SIDE
LEARNING: COSTS AND COMPETITION IN THE US SMARTPHONE INDUSTRY
Introduction
Smartphones have transformed the way people communicate, and seem to pervade
more aspects of people’s lives all the time. The first true smartphone was BellSouth’s
Simon Personal Communicator (Sager [2012]), and smartphones took various forms until
the introduction of Apple Inc.’s iPhone, released in July 2007. The iPhone was the first
smartphone of the form most people are used to today, with a full touch-screen display,
and a variety of features, including music, email, and of course, cellular phone calling
(Apple, Inc. [2007]).
I investigate firm competition in the US smartphone industry, an industry with
significant fixed costs and intellectual property in which firms release new devices
frequently to remain at the forefront of available technology and consumer demand. For
example, various versions of the ten iPhone models have been released over 12 unique
release dates in a seven-year period (Apple, Inc. [2007]). As of this writing, four of the ten
iPhone models remain in production while Samsung has released more than 20 individual
Galaxy S-series devices in less than five years. Dates of device release and discontinuation
are among the strategic dynamic decisions firms must make in order to compete in this
market. Another feature of this market is that firms likely do not have perfect information
about demand because the technology and product space changes and develops so rapidly.
I focus my model around these features using a dynamic oligopoly model expanding
on the seminal work of Ericson and Pakes [1995b]. Specifically, in each period of the
dynamic game, firms decide whether to release or discontinue devices and how to price
67
their device in the current period. In doing so, firms learn about demand and costs in the
industry by forming rational expectations over the parameters of those functions similar to
recursive least squares adaptive learning as in Evans and Honkapohja [2001]. Within each
period, firms compete in a static, Bertrand-Nash pricing game of competition that I adapt
from Berry et al. [1995] (henceforth, BLP) to incorporate this learning and incomplete
information.
With this framework in place, I proceed with estimation adapting the empirical
strategy of Bajari et al. [2007] (henceforth, BBL). That is, I estimate demand as a
function of product attributes and unobserved characteristics, optimal policy functions
for device release and discontinuation dates, costs of a new-product release, costs of
production, entry cost, and scrap values. To accomplish this, I must estimate optimal
policy functions for firms. With these in hand, I find market entry costs and market exit
scrap values over $2 billion, device release costs over $100 million, and costs to continue
offering a device model for sale equal to about $16 million. These substantial fixed costs
are economically important with meaningful impact on the competitive environment.
Using these results, I determine the strategic behavior of firms and the value of product
attributes and advances to consumers.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 presents industry background
and recent literature related to the rest of this work in industry, theory, and empirical
strategy. Section 4.3 presents my theoretical model of the industry and Section 4.4
presents the empirical strategy for estimation of the theoretical model. Finally, I introduce
the data available for estimation in Section 4.5 and estimation results in Section 4.6 before
concluding in Section 4.7.
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Background
Smartphones are the combination of cellular telephones with a variety of other
features, typically features previously found on Personal Data Assistants, or PDAs. The
earliest of these was the BellSouth’s Simon Personal Communicator released in 1994. This
was followed by the rise of Research In Motion (RIM)’s BlackBerry devices, which were
the market leaders in the United States for about a decade. The first device by RIM was
available in 1996 and allowed users to send messages over the internet. By 1999, the first
product under the BlackBerry name was released and could send and receive emails. This
email client was even made available on other companies’ devices.
In 2007, Apple released the original iPhone. This smartphone was the first of the
modern design - a large touchscreen display that included a touchscreen keyboard and
a variety of features including phone, SMS messaging, camera, email, iPod, and the full
internet via Apple’s Safari internet browser. Estimates of the cost to develop the original
iPhone are as low as $150 million (Vogelstein [2008]), but others have cited the R&D
budget of the company over the iPhone’s development period being more than $2.6 billion,
noting details revealed in a lawsuit in which Apple was suing Samsung for $2.5 billion
(Bloomberg [2013]). The iPhone 3G came with the ability to access faster 3G network
as well as the App Store. Apple’s App Store allowed 3rd party developers to create and
sell software for use on a smartphone, a feature that has proved extremely valuable to the
consumers and companies alike (Kim [2012]).
Between 2007 and the present, wireless networks also improved from AT&T’s edge
network, to 3G, to 4G today. This network improvement, along with the technological
improvement of the devices themselves, came with massive adoption through time. More
than 250 million smarphones were sold worldwide in the year of 2010, and 28 percent of
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mobile phone users were using smartphones. Today this number is much greater; in the
third quarter of 2014 alone, more than 335 million smartphones were sold worldwide.
Indeed, this industry has been well studied given its age. Cullen and Shcherbakov
[2010] model consumer behavior in the cell phone industry focusing on switching costs
between providers and the durability of devices themselves. The authors find significant
evidence of switching costs at a dollar amount of $230 USD. Also focused on cell phone
service providers, Zhu et al. [2011] investigate exclusive agreements between device
manufacturers and carriers and the impact of these agreements on consumers. Here, the
authors find that eliminating the exclusive contract of the iPhone with AT&T would have
increased consumer welfare by $326 million. Sinkinson [2014] studies this relationship
as well and focuses on the supply-side showing that Apple must have negotiated with
competing carriers and AT&T had the highest willingness to pay for the exclusive
agreement.
Network effects of different platforms have also played an important role in the
market. Indeed, Luo [2015] finds that penetration of smartphones in the market would
be 54.7% lower in the absence of these network effects. These primarily come from the
operating systems; for example, when more consumers are using a given operating system,
more third-party app developers will serve that operating system. Kim [2012] finds that
Apple provided more benefit to consumers in terms of applications, but Google’s Android
system experienced higher sales due to better quality hardware when adjusted for price.
Bresnahan et al. [2014] investigate the app developer market and find that, especially
for those of the most well-used applications, developers prefer to supply their apps to
multiple platforms rather than choosing just one. In addition to platform choice, device
manufacturers can price discriminate by offering various products that are vertically
differentiated. Fan and Yang [2014] study this price discrimination and consider how this
situation compares to firms producing only their best product.
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In my research, I use data from 2007 to 2014 to examine how firms make strategic,
dynamic, profit-maximizing decisions. Specifically, I investigate the costs of entry and
releasing new devices, when firms strategically release or discontinue devices, and how
demand and costs change with product attributes in the highly competitive and evolving
market. To accomplish this, I estimate a dynamic oligopoly model drawing from Ericson
and Pakes [1995b] and Doraszelski and Pakes [2007] for a conceptual framework. I then
implement the estimation methodology of BBL to obtain empirical estimates of the
parameters of the model using the data. In order to utilize BBL, I extend BLP to estimate
the unobserved state-variables. Various other work has used these methods to investigate
other problems.1
Theoretical Model
The theoretical model I develop follows closely to Ericson and Pakes [1995b] and the
related literature on empirical dynamic oligopoly models discussed in Section 4.2. There
are two types of firms: (1) incumbent firms that compete in the market, and (2) potential
entrants that may choose to enter. In each period, there are Nt incumbent firms, and ε
potential entrants. Market demand is determined by the size of the market, M , and the
value of the incumbents’ devices to consumers relative to an outside option. Based on
costs and demand, firms compete in Bertrand-Nash price competition in each period’s
device market conditional on the state of the industry. This equilibrium is a static Nash
equilibrium in prices. However, between the static price competition, firms compete in
a dynamic game in which they strategically release new devices and discontinue existing
devices each period. Equilibrium in this game is a Markov Perfect Equilibrium in that
equilibrium strategies depend only on the state of the industry, actions, and shocks in that
period.
1See, for example Ryan [2012].
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When making decisions, firms maximize the discounted sum of future profits. Profits
are given by the profit function pii(st, ait, a−it, νit(ait)); thus, firms seek to maximize the
recursive value function:
V (st, at, νit (ait)) = pii(st, ait, a−it, νit(ait)) + E [βV (st+1, at+1, νit+1 (ait+1))]
where V ( ) is the value function dependent on the state, actions, and cost shock, st is
the vector of state variables in period t, at is the vector of actions by all firms in period
t, ait is the set of actions taken by firm i in period t, a−it is the set of actions of all firms
except firm i in period t, νit(ait) is the action-specific cost shock to firm i in period t for
actions ait, E denotes the expected value, and β is a common discount factor to all firms.
Note that if firm i exits the market in period tˆ, the value function, V (·), will be equal
to zero for each period t > tˆ. Also, in my model, the expectation, E, reflects not only
the uncertainty due to random cost shocks as in previous literature, but also uncertainty
because firms are learning about the industry through time as the product space evolves
and more data become available. The evolution of the learned-demand state variables is
uncertain, so supply-side learning is one source of uncertainty over which firms must form
their expectations. Thus, firms form expectations over various sources of uncertainty.
Each period incumbents make multiple strategic decisions. Incumbents decide
whether to release new devices, and if so, how many.2 For each device released, firms incur
a device-release cost, φr, associated with releasing that device. Incumbents also decide
whether to discontinue each existing device in each period. If an incumbent discontinues
all the devices it has on the market without releasing any new devices, it exits and
2For empirical tractability, I assume product attributes of released products are exogenous. This, along
with research and development, is likely a fruitful area for future work.
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recovers its scrap-value, φs. Releasing or discontinuing a device takes one period; these
decisions do not take effect until the following period.3
Potential entrants also make strategic decisions deciding whether to enter, and if so,
how many devices to release upon entry. To enter the market, an entrant must release at
least one device. Entrants face new-device release cost, φr, but also face market-entry cost,
φe. These costs are in addition to production costs. Finally, potential entrants are short
lived and if one does not enter the market this period, it ceases to exist.
Following BBL, all firms competing in the device market choose a price each period
to maximize single-period profits. This is set with a first-order profit-maximization
condition, conditional on demand, the set of competing products, and costs. Demand is
assumed to take the form of a logit model, such that the quantity demanded of a given
product, Qjt, is equal to
Qjt = M × exp(Ujt)
1 +
Jt∑
k=1
exp(Ukt)
where Jt is the number of devices in the market in period t, and Ujt is the value of
product j to consumers in period t. Firms are assumed to face production marginal costs
dependent on device attributes (e.g. screen size, processor speed), and per-period fixed
costs per device on the market so that firm i’s cost for device j in period t is given by
Cijt = F + cjtQjt
3Another possible area for future work is to investigate which firms are potential entrants, and whether
those firms being short-lived is a realistic assumption. That is, it is not unusual to see firms in related
industries enter this market rather than entirely new firms.
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where F represents the per-period fixed costs per device,4 and cjt represents the per-unit
marginal cost for device j. Firms also observe a cost shock, νit(ait), each period depending
on what actions, ait, they choose. They observe these shocks privately before making
decisions. Thus, total production cost for firm i in period t is given by
Cit = νit(ait) +
∑
j ∈ Ξit
Cijt
where Ξit is the set of devices being produced by firm i in period t.
To this point, most of this model is in line with previous empirical dynamic oligopoly
models. Inspired by Jovanovic [1982], I extend this literature by assuming that firms learn
through time. Rather than the learning-by-doing style of learning (e.g. Jarmin [1994]),
which may be more familiar in the industrial economics literature, I introduce an adaptive-
learning framework in the style of Evans and Honkapohja [2001]. In doing so, I follow
the learning literature from macroeconomics such that all firms are assumed to estimate
demand as econometricians. Here, each firm implements BLP to estimate demand over
the product space, then makes strategic decisions dependent on the estimated demand.
Note that very recent work of Doraszelski et al. [2015] also brings adaptive learning
to the industrial economics literature, and finds evidence of such learning in a newly
formed industry of frequency response in the UK. I assume agents share a common
beliefs about demand because BLP uses market-level data commonly known to all firms.
Future work might consider Bayesian updating where firms are heterogeneous in their
demand estimates through differing priors, which, at least in theory, may be estimated.
Alternatively, each firm may only have industry data for the time-period over which
that firm has been competing in the market; this would cause more senior firms to have
4It is theoretically possible to incorporate learning in this context as well such that F could be firm
specific and depend on industry experience. I do not currently incorporate this feature, but this may be a
fruitful area of work in the future.
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superior knowledge and provide a flavor of learning-by-doing. I present these as interesting
areas for future research, but proceed in this work as described above.
Demand is assumed to be constant. Preferences of consumers do not change; only
the products change through time causing shifts in consumption and market shares.
Although the firms’ econometricians update their estimates each period to take advantage
of more information, they assume that preferences over product attributes are constant
over time.5
The timing of the model is as follows.
1. The period begins in a given state, st. This state includes the number of firms and
devices in the market, as well as those devices’ attributes, and estimated demand.
2. Firms draw private information. For incumbents this includes a scrap value, φs
drawn from distribution Fs(·). For potential entrants, this includes a market-entry
cost, φe drawn from distribution Fe(·). All firms in the period draw firm- and action-
specific cost shocks, νit(ait).
3. Firms make strategic decisions simultaneously. Each entrant chooses whether to
enter, and if so, how many devices to release. Each incumbent decides how many
devices, if any, to release and discontinue. If an incumbent discontinues all devices,
they exit the industry. Incumbent firms also choose prices for each device.
4. Firms compete in static, differentiated product, price competition to maximize
single-period profits.6
5. The state, st is updated to st+1 (e.g. new products are released, firms enter and exit,
demand estimates are updated, etc.) and the next period begins.
This happens each period and firms compete with an infinite time-horizon.
5An oblivious equilibrium concept may also be useful where firms estimate demand for their product
relative to the average product. This would simplify the simulation described in Section 4.4 because firms
would not need to consider the evolution of different device attributes, only the evolution of the average
device and number of devices. However, this would complicate the demand estimation because each firm
would have its own estimates based on its own product. I proceed assuming shared beliefs about demand.
6This framework may also support dynamic pricing decisions, research and development, and
advertising decisions, but I do not consider any of these here.
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Estimation Strategy
I adapt BBL to estimate this dynamic oligopoly model using an adaptation of
their two-step estimation strategy. In the first step, the econometrician estimates state-
transition probabilities and policy functions, which leads to estimation of value functions
by forward simulation. In the second step, the econometrician estimates the structural
parameters of the model. This estimation strategy assumes that all state-variables are
observed. In this case, there are state-variables that are unobserved to the econometrician,
which previous literature has handled, but also state-variables that are unobserved to the
firms themselves (e.g. demand). I develop a supply-side learning framework via iterative
BLP to handle states unobserved to the firms as well as BLP to estimate unobserved
state-variables that are unobserved to me, the econometrician, but are otherwise observed
by the firms.
Unobserved State Variables
Since all state-variables are not observed, I begin by estimating the unobserved
state-variables and treating these as observed proxies to the true state-variables.7 The
state includes costs, which are known to the firms, and demand, which firms learn
about through time as more data become available. Thus, I first estimate the learned
demand parameters at each point in time. I do this using BLP separately at each period,
using data up to that period for estimation. In the last period, using all of the data in
the sample and firms’ first-order conditions, I estimate costs. Below, I introduce the
framework of BLP.
I assume that demand follows the usual logit framework, such that consumers choose
the alternatives that maximizes their utilities. Utility is modelled as a function of observed
7This is as suggested by BBL.
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product attributes, Xj, prices, pjt, demographic characteristics drawn from the population
distribution, Di, unobserved product specific attributes, ξj, and a random component, ijt.
Assuming a type-I extreme-value distribution of ijt provides the usual logit framework.
Firms are modeled as multi-product oligopolists that compete on price. BLP uses observed
device characteristics, market shares, known market distributions of demographics, and
market size to estimate demand parameters and costs. To do so, I implement the following
procedure drawn from Nevo [2000].
1. Draw individuals labelled i = 1, . . . , I¯ from the population distribution. Each of
these individuals is a set of demographics that enter the utility function.8
2. Given demand parameters of a given draw, θ, compute predicted probabilities for
each person i, and average over these individuals to get predicted market shares,
Sˆ(θ).
3. Compute the mean level of utility from alternative j as δj using the contraption
mapping δh+1j = δ
h
j + log(Sj) − log(Sˆ(θ)) where Sj is the observed market share.
Iterate this contraption mapping to convergence.
4. Solve for the unobserved product attributes by ξj(θ) = δj −Xjθ.
5. Finally, I use this to estimate the parameters using GMM by:
θˆ = argmin
θ
G(θ)
where G(θ) = ξ(θ)′ZΦ−1Z ′ξ(θ)
where Z is a matrix of instruments and Φ is the weighting matrix.
8BLP also includes random coefficients. I also draw the random part of these coefficients here.
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6. With demand parameters in hand, I use the firms’ first order conditions to compute
costs. In vector notation, the first order condition is given by
S −∆(p−mc) = 0 =⇒ mc = p−∆−1S
where ∆ is the relevant set of own- and cross-price elasticities for a firm’s products.
Transition Probabilities
Part of the first step of BBL is to estimate transition probabilities. For a small
number of states, observed transitions can be used to estimate sample averages as
transition probabilities. In this case, the state vector, st, includes the number of firms, the
learned demand parameters, the number of devices as well as the attributes of each device.
Thus, the space in which the states exist is not small enough to take this approach.
Instead, I parameterize each state transition. Specifically, firms assume that the attributes
of any phone on the market is constant from the time it is released to the time it is
discontinued. Thus, there are no state transitions for these state variables. The number
of firms and products evolves according to the firm entry and exit strategies. These are
determined by the policy functions and cost shocks. As discussed below, this is sufficient
for estimation to this point. The remaining issue is the distribution of cost shocks. This
distribution is estimated from the policy functions derived in the next step and the
observed transitions. This is sufficient to this point. As noted above, firms assume that
they have the best estimates of demand, so that firms assume this state does not change
through time when forming expectations, even though estimated demand will change
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through time in practice. This is for computational tractability, but could theoretically
be relaxed.9
Finally, the attributes of new devices are the last states to be accounted for. I
parameterize the state transitions of new-device attributes according to an autoregressive
process. That is, for a new device, each attribute is assumed to be randomly drawn from a
process according to the firm’s existing products, or an industry average. Specifically, for
continuous product attributes, the kth attribute for product j released in period t, xkjt, is
given by
xkjt =

δki x
k
j−1 + ε
k, if the firm is an incumbent
δke x˜
k
t−1 + ε
k, if the firm is a new entrant
where xkj−1 is the median value of the product’s k
th attribute among the firm’s existing
products, x˜kt−1 is the median value of the k
th attribute among devices released during
the previous period, δki and δ
k
e are estimable parameters, and ε
k is a mean-zero random
component with a variance to be estimated from observed device releases. For discrete
product attributes, the kth attribute for product j released in period t is given by
xkjt ∼

Pr
(
xkjt|xkj−1
)
, if the firm is an incumbent
Pr
(
xkjt|x˜kt−1
)
, if the firm is a new entrant
where the notation is the same as above for xkj−1 and x˜
k
t−1, but here Pr(·) is a discrete
probability distribution to be estimated from observed device releases, conditional on
either the firm’s most recent device-release or the previous-period industry median. This
is also subject to reasonable attribute-specific restrictions. For example, the median device
at the time of this writing would have the android operating system, but Apple would
9For example, we could estimate the change in demand parameters as a random walk and use this to
define transition probabilities. This is computationally burdensome, so I treat these states as assumed
constant, as described here.
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never release a device without its iOS operating system. These informed restrictions are
used in estimation.
Policy Functions
Optimal policy for each firm is a set of discrete choices. To my knowledge, methods
from the existing literature (e.g. Hotz and Miller [1993] and BBL) allow for unordered,
discrete strategic variables in the value-function context.10 As shown in Hotz and Miller
[1993], inverting choice probabilities for discrete variables gives relative value functions of
actions where the optimal policy is to choose the argmax of the value functions. That is,
for policy ait, the firm’s optimal policy function, σ(st, a−it, νit(ait)), can be inferred from
the value function, v(st, at), such that
σ(st, a−it, νit(ait)) = ait ⇐⇒ v(st, ait, a−it) + νit(ait) ≥ v(st, a¯it, a−it) + νit(a¯it) ∀ a¯it ∈ Ait
where Ait is the set of possible actions, v(·) are the choice specific value functions, and ν(·)
are the choice specific cost shocks. Thus, using the observed data and a parameterization
of v(·) as a function of the state, I am able to estimate the value function using a standard
maximum likelihood logit approach for each of the strategic variables.11 This provides the
optimal policy function in a parametric form that can be used for any state.
Value Functions
The value function, V (st, σt|Θ), includes current-period profits plus the expected
discounted sum of future profits. To form this expectation, BBL calls for the simulation
of future states. Given the optimal policy functions estimated previously, I simulate a
10In general, there are two potential types of strategic variables: discrete and continuous. This model
only uses dynamic strategic variables that are discrete.
11I assume that each of these decisions is independent.
80
large set of possible future states. This is done by assuming the earlier policy functions
hold, generating random shocks for νit(ait), and solving for future profits in each of the
forward-simulated periods. I then compute the discounted sum of future profits for each
simulation, and, taking the average over this set of simulations, I find an estimate of the
value function for each observed state and optimal policy. That is, I find an estimate of
V (st, σt|Θ) = E
[ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tpi(sτ , στ , νiτ ; Θ)
∣∣∣∣st,Θ
]
(4.1)
where Θ are the structural parameters and st includes learned demand. This value
function captures current-period profits, as well as the expected future profits based
on the information that firms have at the time these expectations are formed. That is,
this expectation can and will change as new information becomes available through the
updated demand parameters as firms learn more about the market each period.
Completing estimation of the structural parameters using the minimum distance
estimator of BBL requires evaluation of this value function repeatedly for different
values of the structural parameters, Θ. In general, this requires simulation of the value
function separately for each attempted value of Θ, which can be severly taxing in terms of
computation. To get around this, BBL suggest using linearity of the profit function in Θ.
That is, assume
pi(st, at, νit; Θ) = Ψ(st, at, νit) ·Θ
where Ψ(·) is a vector of “basis functions”. In this case, I can rewrite the value function as
V (st, σt|Θ) = E
[ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tΨ(sτ , στ , νiτ )
∣∣∣∣st
]
·Θ ≡ W (s, σ) ·Θ (4.2)
where W is this expectation. With this form, I only need to compute the value of W once
and can use that value for any Θ. I use this method here.
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Structural Parameters
With a method for evaluating the value funtions, V (·), it is possible to estimate
the structural parameters. Although a variety of estimation methods are available for
this step, I implement a minimum distance estimator for the structural parameters. The
idea is to find structural parameters that rationalize the policy functions estimated in the
previous step.
The estimation method minimizes the squared sum of violations of the equilibrium
conditions. That is, I search for parameter values that solve the following:
Θˆ = argmin
Θ
∑
i,s,σ′i
(
min {Vi(s, σi, σ−i|Θ, α)− Vi(s, σ′i, σ−i|Θ, α), 0}2
)
where σ′i is an alternate strategy, and α is the set of parameters that parameterize the
optimal policy functions. The minimum between the difference and zero is taken so that, if
the difference is positive and does not represent a violation of the equilibrium conditions,
this is not counted in the distance from an equilibrium. As such, the true value of the
parameters, Θ0, which represents an equilibrium of the model, would cause this distance to
be minimized at zero, however this is not to be expected in practice due to the unobserved
cost shocks.
To estimate this difference, I must also specify alternate strategies, σ′i. Since there is
an infinite number of alternate strategies (e.g. a firm could release any number of phones
in a period), I use the sample equivalent of this minimum difference. The samples of σ′i
from the set of possible alternative strategies is drawn using σ′i = σi + ζ where ζ is a
random shock to the optimal policy function. Specifically, for binary discrete policies, the
alternate strategy is simply the opposite action than was chosen.
Simulation for this procedure can be significant in terms of computation. To avoid
this, I can use the linearity of the profit function in Θ as described in section 4.4. Then,
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forward simulation must still be done separately for each (i, s, σ′i) triple for consistency
and unbiasedness of the estimator. However, I can reuse these simulations for each draw
of Θ. Thus, as was explained above, evaluation of the value functions can be accomplished
with one round of forward simulation, then a dot-product of the vector of basis functions,
W , and the guess at structural parameters, Θ. Specifically, W includes the expected
discounted sum of future devices released, market exit, and devices produced per period,
as well as random shocks to estimate the distribution of these costs.
Data
The data for this project come from International Data Corporation’s Mobile Phone
Tracker.12 These data track cell phones sold in the US over a seven-year period from 2007
until the third quarter of 2014 on a quarterly time-series; this provides 31 time-periods for
estimation. Included in these data are the vendor, network interface (e.g. 4G FD-LTE),
processor vendor, cores, and speed, camera quality, screen size, operating system and
much more. Importantly, in addition to these included features, the data include average
selling price and sales volume in various measures (units, dollars, and shipments). These
data, in tandem with the theory presented in section 4.3, can be used to implement the
estimation strategy developed in section 4.4. This paper makes use of all devices identified
as “smartphones”, which the International Data Corporation’s Mobile Phone Tracker
defines as devices that “contain a high level operating system” such as Android or iOS,
that allow “Third-party appplications . . . to be natively installed”. (idc)
Variables included in estimation include the following: Android, iOS, Windows, and
Other OS are indicator variables indicating that a particular device uses the respective
12The author gratefully acknowledges funding for this data generously provided by the University of
Oregon Department of Economics.
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operating system where the reference group is the BlackBerry operating system.13 3G and
4G are indicator variables for whether a phone has the ability to use 3G and 4G wireless
telecommunications networks, respectively. 16GB and 64GB are indicator variables
indicating whether a phone has more than 16 GB but less than 64 GB of memory, or
more than 64 GB of memory, respectively. Camera indicates whether the smartphone has
a camera. Full Screen, Slider, and OtherForm all indicate the form factor of the phone
where the messenger form factor is the reference group. The standard smartphone in
today’s world would be considered a full screen. TSR is the time since release, or the age
of the specific device model in quarters. Prices are the average selling price of a device as
reported in the data. These prices are the average street price of the specific device model
in that quarter.
In estimating demand, I also make use of demographic variables drawn from the
population distribution: age and college. Age is the age of an individual in years. College
is an indicator variable for whether an individual has completed a college degree. I
obtained demographic information from the IPUMS database. (Ruggles et al. [2010])
These data are then used to draw individuals from the population to identify various
demand parameters.
As can be seen in Figure 16, smartphone sales have increased significantly over the
past decade. With less than five-million individual devices sold in the first quarter of 2007,
there has been an order-of-magnitude increase with over 40 million devices sold in the
third quarter of 2014. The data also show that sales have become more seasonal over time.
The increased sales have created a very large technology market for smartphones. This
market has been, and continues to be, dominated by a few large firms. Figure 17 shows
the number of firms of various sizes by total device sales over the sample time period
13Note that there are no Apple phones without iOS and no iOS phones made by any firm other than
Apple; any identification related to this variable cannot separate effects of the operating system itself from
effects of other Apple indiosyncracies.
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FIGURE 16. US Quarterly Smartphone Sales
FIGURE 17. Distribution of Firm Size
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in the US. Apple has the largest share during this period with more than 200 million
smartphones sold, while only two other firms have more than one fourth of that amount,
those being Samsung and BlackBerry.
In addition to well-documented changes in the devices and technology themselves,
the firms that produce those devices have also changed. While BlackBerry is third in
overall unit sales during the sample period, their market share has fallen dramatically
as the overall size of the market has grown. Figure 18 shows the market shares of at-times-
dominant firms through time. In 2007, BlackBerry held as much as 50% of the total unit
sales of smartphones, but that market share has fallen since 2009 to nearly zero by the
end of the sample. BlackBerry’s fall coincided with the rise of the modern dominant firms:
Apple and Samsung each hold over 20% of unit sales in each quarter over the final four
years of the sample period. This distribution of market shares represents a related split in
the operating systems being used in smartphones being purchased. Figure 19 shows the
distribution of various operating systems through time. In 2008, Google, Inc.’s Android
operating system did not yet exist. By the end of the sample period, Android came
to dominate the smartphone market with 63.45% of all devices sold running Android.
Android is an open-source software platform used by multiple device manufacturing firms
including Samsung, LG, and HTC.
These data are extremely rich, and to my knowledge, have not been used to study
the smartphone market in the literature, allowing for a new examination of the industry.
The dataset is collected from shipments of new mobile phones from vendors. These are
not, then, double counted when shipped between other levels of the distribution network.
In the case where devices are shipped through different countries, they are only counted in
the country of final sale; in this case, this is the US market. Products used by the device
manufacturers themselves are also counted in shipments as are products donated or given
away.
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FIGURE 18. Smartphone-Vendor Quarterly US Market Shares
FIGURE 19. US Mobile OS Market Shares
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Results
In this section, I present the results from estimation of the model presented in
Section 4.3 using the estimation techniques and data presented in Sections 4.4 and 4.5,
respectively. Standard errors are produced by bootstrapping the estimation routine. I
begin with presentation of the structural parameters, which are the final results of the
estimation routine. I then present results from the intermediate estimation steps including
the learned demand coefficients and marginal cost estimates obtained through BLP,
optimal policy-function and transition probability estimates used for forward simulation.
Structural Parameter Estimates
The end result of the estimation for which results are presented here, are the
structural parameter estimates of the model. These include the device release costs, φr,
market entry costs, φe, scrap values, φs, and per-period fixed costs, F . These results are
presented in Table 14. First, consider the device release cost. This is the cost associated
with developing and releasing a new product to the market. φr is a random variable that
firms observe prior to making the decision to release or not release a device. It is drawn
from a normal distribution with a mean of $117 million and a standard deviation of $4.6
million. This is an economically significant cost that reflects the substantial R&D costs
associated with product development as well as advertising and other adminstrative costs.
Even more significant is the market-entry cost, again observed by the firm prior to their
entry in the market. A firm entering the market must pay this cost to begin competing
in the smartphone market. This cost was estimated to have a mean value of $2.68 billion
and a standard deviation of $46 million. This is an economically significant cost to market
entry, and indeed, in line with some estimates of Apple’s research and development costs
associated with “Project Purple” to develop the original iPhone (Bloomberg [2013]). Each
88
firm must pay the advertising and administrative costs of entering the market, but also the
costs of aquiring the requisite technologies.
TABLE 14. Structural Parameter Estimates
Variable Estimate (millions)
Model Release Cost Mean 117.4 ***
(18.47)
Model Release Std Dev 4.572 ***
(0.1223)
Entry Cost Mean 2682 ***
(975.5)
Entry Cost Std Dev 46.11 ***
(2.304)
Scrap Value Mean 2489 ***
(697.8)
Scrap Value Std Dev 65.30 ***
(28.04)
Model Offered Cost 15.78 ***
(3.039)
In addition to costs associated with entering the market and releasing new devices,
I have also estimated the value of market exit. The scrap value is observed by the firm
at the beginning of the period, and after observing this value, firms can choose whether
to discontinue their remaining devices and exit the market. This number is almost
identically large to the market entry cost on the order of about $2.49 billion with a
standard deviation of $65 million. The fact that these numbers are similar may point
to the fact that failing or closing firms are often purchased by other firms.14 Finally, in
addition to these random costs of entry, exit, and new-device release, there are also per-
period fixed costs, F , associated with offering a model each period it is available. This cost
is estimated at $16 million and is equal for all firms and all devices. This cost primarily
reflects the costs associated with selling a product model as separate from others such as
keeping inventory and advertising.
14For example, see the purchase of Motorola Mobility by Google in 2011 (Google, Inc. [2011]).
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Learned Demand and Marginal Cost Estimates
At each period in time, firms are assumed to learn demand as econometricians.
The workhorse empirical method for random-coefficient demand models over the last
two decades has been BLP, and as such, it is reasonable to assume that econometricians
inside these firms are estimating demand according to those models. This method is
implemented in each period using data up until that period to simulate what firms have
learned about demand. Results for this process are presented in Table 15 for estimates
as of quarter 1 in 2010, 2012, and 2014, as well as the last quarter of the sample period,
quarter 3 of 2014. The included variables are Android, iOS, 4G, large Memory, Camera,
Full Screen, OtherForm, TSR, Price, and a constant. TSR, price, operating system,
and camera coefficients are random and also vary according to the age and education of
individuals.
TABLE 15. Learned Demand Over Time
2010Q1 2012Q1 2014Q1 2014Q3
Other OS -2.084 ** -1.785 *** -1.608 *** -1.586 ***
(1.053) (0.04845) (0.2442) (0.1990)
3G -0.3487 *** -0.1528 *** -0.1117 *** -0.1068 ***
(0.0005679) (0.0002761) (0.03006) (0.002269)
4G -0.3765 *** 0.02549 *** 0.1716 ***
(0.1265) (0.0009100) (0.02053)
16GB -0.9654 *** -0.8622 *** -0.5135 *** -0.9306 ***
(0.1841) (0.3320) (0.05101) (0.3487)
64GB 0.2329 *** -1.343 *** -2.453 ***
(0.004886) (0.3395) (0.01441)
Full Screen 0.3253 *** -0.2020 *** -0.2677 *** -0.2476 ***
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(0.01852) (0.009293) (0.02344) (0.07831)
Slider -0.5069 *** -0.6727 ** -0.6406 *** -0.6846 ***
(0.006906) (0.3255) (0.04512) (0.01413)
OtherForm -0.9315 *** -0.7589 *** -0.6679 *** -0.6679 ***
(0.1491) (0.2269) (0.05493) (0.2375)
TSR 0.04620 *** -0.4298 *** -0.4277 *** -0.4821 **
(0.006262) (0.07216) (0.01139) (0.2433)
TSR Std Dev -0.05586 *** 0.06439 *** -0.001782 ** 0.0001064 ***
(0.01895) (0.003112) (0.0008310) (0.000004306)
TSR#Age 0.002279 * 0.01069 * 0.009315 * 0.01393 ***
(0.001186) (0.006067) (0.005179) (0.004636)
TSR#College -0.001212 *** 0.006353 ** 0.0001184 *** -0.00009737 ***
(0.00008027) (0.003014) (0.00003179) (0.000002845)
Price -0.0009647 *** 0.001193 * 0.008388 ** -0.001808 ***
(0.0001223) (0.0006496) (0.003958) (0.0002789)
Price Std Dev 0.0004397 *** 0.001104 *** -0.001961 *** 0.0002295 ***
(0.00006159) (0.00009480) (0.0001958) (0.00005407)
Price#Age 0.0003659 *** 0.0001577 * -0.0001213 * 0.0001679 ***
(0.0001048) (0.00008451) (0.00006287) (0.00005478)
Price#College -3.872 *** -0.1435 *** 0.002594 *** 0.002559 ***
(1.404) (0.003644) (0.0001420) (0.0001350)
Android -0.1814 ** -2.595 *** 0.1321 *** 0.7170 ***
(0.08800) (0.7358) (0.03865) (0.1731)
Android Std Dev -0.002988 ** -0.007888 *** 0.0004274 *** 0.000008114 ***
(0.001244) (0.0007819) (0.00003803) (0.000001191)
Android#Age 0.05589 *** 0.08150 ** 0.01170 *** -0.001281 ***
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(0.003974) (0.03517) (0.001285) (0.00004749)
Android#College -0.001859 *** -0.002415 *** -0.00001470 *** -0.00002546 ***
(0.00007502) (0.0004347) (0.000001182) (0.000004082)
iOS -1.048 * 0.8792 * 1.442 *** 1.703 ***
(0.5471) (0.4672) (0.1417) (0.1664)
iOS Std Dev -0.0006782 *** -0.002394 *** -0.00001673 *** -0.000004590 ***
(0.000004679) (0.0001141) (0.000003035) (0.0000006562)
iOS#Age 0.05482 *** 0.007097 *** 0.004496 *** -0.0007571 **
(0.01506) (0.0007915) (0.0007234) (0.0003074)
iOS#College 0.0002844 *** -0.002978 *** 0.00002244 *** -0.000006527 ***
(0.00008360) (0.0004579) (0.000001752) (0.000002398)
Windows 0.1833 ** -0.2405 *** -0.05777 ***
(0.08118) (0.06353) (0.01391)
Windows Std Dev 0.001062 *** 0.00006758 -0.000004649 ***
(0.00006113) (0.00004497) (0.0000007554)
Windows#Age -0.02029 *** 0.001933 *** -0.0004338 ***
(0.007047) (0.0002969) (0.0001020)
Windows#College -0.0001077 *** 0.00001344 *** -0.000001095 ***
(0.000003521) (0.0000002924) (0.0000002938)
Camera 13.83 *** 7.131 *** 0.6947 *** 0.7987 ***
(4.347) (1.982) (0.1339) (0.1048)
Camera Std Dev 0.07440 *** -0.02245 ** 0.0003334 *** -0.00001489 ***
(0.003004) (0.009495) (0.0001246) (0.000001182)
Camera#Age -0.2826 *** -0.1115 *** 0.002301 *** -0.001357 **
(0.03253) (0.02987) (0.0005525) (0.0005951)
Camera#College -0.007833 *** 0.001917 *** 0.00001647 *** -0.00002458 ***
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(0.002652) (0.00009174) (0.000002014) (0.000004257)
Constant -11.63 *** -7.000 *** -4.109 *** -4.573 ***
(2.770) (2.051) (1.060) (1.750)
Time since release (TSR) is estimated to have a small, but positive impact on
demand in early periods, but this effect is estimated as negative when more data become
available. This points to consumers’ preference for newer devices over older devices; in
line with the findings of Thacker and Wilson [2015], younger people have more interest
in newer technologies than older people, all else equal. The price coefficient is estimated
to have a non-random component that is negative when using all of the data. However,
this is not the case in 2014, quarter 1; further, the effect of age on the price coefficient is
enough such that most consumers would have decreased utility from higher prices.15 Also
note that the constant in this utility function is negative. This points towards a preference
for the outside option relative to purchasing a new device. Since most consumers purchase
a phone approximately every two years, and the specified market size for each quarter is
25% of the US population, most consumers in the market will not choose to buy a new
phone, so that the outside option receives a large share of the market.16
Among the remaining results, consumers prefer the Android and iOS operating
systems over the alternatives. This likely explains why there has been a shift by producers
towards the open-source Android operating system over their own software. Additionally,
15With a different distributional assumption on the random part of the coefficient such that it must
be either positive or negative for all consumers, I expect that this coefficient may be economically more
significant.
16One important aspect to this consumer decision is the outside option. For those consumers who have
the “top-of-the-line” device, the outside option is much more attractive than for those consumers who do
not yet own a device. This is one direction for future work in this area.
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these likely reflect the network effects associated with operating systems and their third-
party applications. Across all periods, consumers prefer phones with cameras to phones
without cameras. The results are not consistent across periods as to whether consumers
like phones with more memory.
TABLE 16. Marginal Cost Estimates
Variable Estimate
Android -0.3538 **
(0.1471)
iOS 0.2030 ***
(0.04487)
Windows -0.2506 ***
(0.0006505)
OtherOS 0.05418
(0.03627)
3G 0.005978 *
(0.003469)
4G 0.2512 **
(0.09810)
16GB 0.4812 ***
(0.1853)
64GB 0.5927 ***
(0.2288)
Camera -0.1129 **
(0.04726)
Full Screen -0.1910 ***
(0.06696)
Slider 0.1415 **
(0.06360)
Other Form -0.07143 ***
(0.005780)
Constant 5.987 *
(3.285)
These last attributes are also those that largely impact production costs. Using BLP,
I also uncover the marginal costs of production according to the following marginal cost
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function:
log(mc) = wγ + ω
where w are the attributes of the phone and γ are the associated marginal-cost
coefficients. All else zero, the cost of producing the marginal device is $398.06. This is
made cheaper by using the Android operating system rather than developing a firm’s
own software; specifically, marginal costs are approximately 35% lower when using the
Android software. These are significant cost savings over the alternative. Note that while
the iOS variable is named for the operating system, the variation in the data does not
allow separate identification of the costs associated with the iOS operating system from
the other costs that are specific to Apple, Inc. devices. Finally, note that phones with 4G
service and more memory are more costly to produce, while phones of the full screen form-
factor are actually cheaper to produce.
Policy Function
In order to estimate the structural parameters of the model, it is necessary to
simulate the future of the market to estimate the discounted sum of future profits for a
firm given the strategies that they choose in the current period. These value functions are
then used to uncover the relative values of the structural parameters using equilibrium
conditions of the model. To simulate the future, it is necessary to simulate firms’ actions
in the future based on the future state of the market. This is achieved with the estimation
of policy functions as presented in Table 17. The three columns represent the estimated
policy functions for the three dynamic strategic decisions a firm must make in each period.
The entry column presents the policy function of potential entrants. This is a binary
logit with which firms choose whether to enter the smartphone market. There are 10
potential entrants in each quarter, and most choose not enter, hence the negative constant
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coefficient. The other explanatory variable is the firm’s predicted market share were it to
be competing with a product in the current period. This is generated using the transition
probabilities for product characteristics presented in the following subsection as well as the
learned demand up to the current period. This coefficient is negative, but not statistically
significant, pointing to statistically zero impact of the firms’ predicted market share on its
decision to enter the market. While this is somewhat counter-intuitive, this only bolsters
the idea that firms are not myopic, but rather focus on profits in the long-run.
TABLE 17. Firm Policy Function Estimates
Entry Release Discontinue
Constant -14.77 *** 0.5678 *** -1.335
(1.181) (0.02035) (0.8332)
Predicted Market Share -0.06466
(0.2450)
Product Market Share 1.123 ** 9.952 ***
(0.4728) (1.309)
Other Share -2.250 *** -0.8657 **
(0.6152) (0.3826)
Product#Other Market Share 0.03566 *** -89.34 ***
(0.001798) (33.56)
Incumbent firms have a different decision to make, and therefore, different policy
functions. The first is the decision to release a new device. The firm decides whether to
release a new device in the following period based on a binary logit with explanatory
variables as follows: the predicted market share of a released device generated using the
transition probabilities for product characteristics presented in the following subsection,
the predicted market share of all other devices produced by the same firm in the absence
of this could-be-released device, and the product of these two variables. The results show
that the probability that a firm releases a new product is increasing in that product’s
predicted market share, but decreasing in the market share of the firm’s other products.
The larger the market share of the firm’s other products, the more a new product
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cannibalizes the firm’s own-product market shares as opposed to market shares of other
firms, and the more likely that firm will choose to not release a new device. This also
depends on the relative values of these variables through their cross-product, but this
effect is economically insignificant.17 Finally, the incumbent firms also decide whether
to discontinue the production of their existing device models. Firms are less likely to
discontinue a device, the larger the market share of the firm’s other devices. This may
point to larger firms producing a larger variety of products; while the coefficient on the
device’s own market share is positive, it is closer to zero, if not negative, when the cross-
product coefficient is also considered. For the largest firms, a device with a small market
share is much more likely to be discontinued, but firms with few other products are less
likely be influenced in this decision by a lower market share.
New Products’ Attributes and Transition Probabilities
The final part of the estimation routine to be presented is the estimation of
transition probabilities. Most the state variables, such as the number of firms and
devices, are determined by the optimal policy functions of the firms; however, the product
attributes of newly released devices are taken as exogenous in this model. The model for
the attributes of new device models are determined either by ordinary least squares for
continuous variables or by logit for discrete variables. For incumbent firms, attributes
of new products are determined by a constant and the median of that product attribute
within the firm. For new entrants, attributes of new products are determined by a
constant and the median of that product attribute over the entire market.
Note that for most of the discrete variables, the coefficient on the market median
value is positive. This points to new entrant devices following the market rather than
17Note that the value of the cross-product variable is quite small given that both variables are less than
one, and most are below 0.001.
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moving away from the market median, as might have been expected if a firm entered
with the intention of offering a unique device. Whether a new device is produced by an
incumbent firm or a new entrant, that device has a relatively low probability of offering
4G service unless the incumbent (for incumbent devices) or the market (for entrant
devices) is already producing 4G devices, in which case, this is more likely. This likely
has to do with the time variation in availability of 4G service in the early part of the
sample relative to the end of the sample. Finally, note TSR is not estimated since it is
non-random and known.
Conclusion
I have developed a theoretical model of oligopolistic competition for the smartphone
industry that expands on the existing applied dynamic oligopoly literature to include
adaptive supply-side learning through the use of iterative BLP. I have then adapted
existing methods of BBL to allow estimation of the structural parameters of the
model. I have also developed iterative BLP to estimate the model in the presence of
the supply-side learning mechanism in which firms learn about demand through time.
The notable changes in learned demand over time as seen in Table 15 suggest that
there can be substantial differences in estimated coefficients when using different data
from different periods. Assuming that firms are no better demand modelers than BLP,
incorporating adaptive learning into the firms’ forecasts is important for modeling their
value functions and expected future profits, which ultimately determine their strategic
actions. Additionally, in using a two-step estimation routine such as BBL, the more
accurate the estimates of the underlying value functions, the better will be our estimates
of the structural parameters.
In applying these methods to the smartphone industry, I have shown that production
with open source software (Android) is cheaper than proprietary software and also
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preferred by consumers, except to Apple products; I have also shown that there are
substantial fixed costs associated with this market, both in terms of entering the market
initially, as well as releasing new devices after entry. Interestingly, the scrap value for firms
exiting the market are similar in magnitude to the entry costs which may be unsurprising
given the large role of intellectual property in this market, intellectual property that often
leads to litigation. (Chia [2012]) Indeed, this intellectual property may be sold when a firm
exits the market, justifying the high scrap value.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
My dissertation research focuses on the telephony markets in the United States, with
specific interest in the evolution of the industry from primarily landline driven to, in large
part, cellular. The evolution of technology related to cell phones has been a major factor
in the change and evolution of the market.
Early in the years of cell phones, the divestiture of AT&T’s local landline services
had recently changed the competitive landscape of the landline telephony market. At the
time of this change, it was not yet clear whether cell phones would provide a complement
or substitute to landline service, a question that would be of import to policy makers
making regulatory decisions with respect to the landline market in the decades following
the introduction of cell phones. Since cell phone technologies have developed, we have also
seen the introduction of a new class of cell phone: the smartphone. Smartphone markets
have not only changed the wireless telephone markets, but have evolved into one of the
primary technology markets today. It is both the evolution from landline to cell phone,
and the evolution of smartphones and dynamic strategic competition on which I focus my
research.
The substantive work of my dissertation begins with a chapter on the evolution of
consumer choices in the landline and cell phone telephony market. Implementing discrete
choice econometric techniques, I find that different market segments are responsible for
the adoption of cell phones through time; specifically, it is younger and larger households
that drive adoption of the new technology, with larger households often maintaining both
telephony services in the household. With these results in hand, I develop and apply
a decomposition of a measure of substitutability and find that the substitutability of
landlines and cell phones has changed significantly over the sample period from 1994 to
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2012. These two technologies have become more substitutable through time, indicating an
increasing competitive constraint on landlines from cell phones.
In studying this problem, I searched for a flexible alternative to modeling the
evolution of choice through time. In reading a paper by Engle [2014], I was introduced
to the concept of time-varying parameters. In the context of discrete choice, changes in
parameters may reflect changes in preferences and culture, but most prominently in this
case is the change in technology. If the utility function of the discrete choice model reflects
the value of the underlying alternatives to consumers, and the underlying alternatives
change in a meaningful way, then, indeed, the utility function should also change. To
model this, I develop an econometric methodology capable of estimating latent-dependent
variable models, such as discrete choice logit models, with time-varying parameters. I then
apply this to the US telephone industry. This methodology allows the decoupling of price
sensitivity from the increase in value from evolving technologies. The results suggest that,
while cell phones have gotten better with time, consumers have also become more price
sensitive. This, again, points to increasing competition for landline service providers from
cell phones due to the increased substitutability of these products.
In the final substantive chapter of my dissertation, I model the US smartphone
industry in a dynamic setting. I extend the model of Ericson and Pakes [1995a] to allow
for adaptive learning and apply this model to the data using an iterative version of Berry
et al. [1995] and the empirical estimation routine of Bajari et al. [2007]. In doing so, I
find evidence of substantial fixed costs associated with entering the industry and releasing
new devices reflecting the presence of economically important intellectual property in
this market. The results also suggest that the demand parameters that are learned by
the firms through the employment of econometricians may, indeed, change through
time, which would cause errors in the computation of value functions if not properly
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addressed. With these results, I can value various product attributes to consumers and
their production costs to firms.
The work of the dissertation research made use of various tools from my economic
toolkit in order to study the US telephony industry, from utility maximization and
consumer choice, to dynamic oligopoly models of imperfect competition in the presence
of differentiated products. This also involved substantial econometrics including maximum
likelihood, Bayesian MCMC techniques with a SMC filter, generalized method of moments,
and a minimum distance estimator, among others. Ultimately, I have developed a research
program that covers the vast majority of evolution in cell phone technologies, as well as
the industrial economics that have led to important change in the industry for incumbent
firms, potential entrants, policy-makers, and the US consumer.
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APPENDIX A
HOUSEHOLD CHOICE
As discussed in Section 2.3, the telephony service alternatives for households
are (1) no phone, (2) just landline, (3) just cell phone, or (4) both. The data contain
expenditures for a household from the quarter prior to the interview in many different
categories defined by a universal classification code (UCC).1 There is a unique UCC
for cell phone expenditures and another unique UCC for landline expenditures. For a
household with strictly-positive expenditure on the UCC of landline or cell service,2 I
record this expenditure as a choice between alternatives. That is, for an expenditure
greater than zero, the household is recorded as choosing that category but recorded as
not choosing that category otherwise. Choosing no phone is defined as zero expenditure in
both categories while choosing both is defined as positive expenditure in both categories.
The data are available dating to before the introduction of cell phone services, but all
records of cell phone expenses are zero-valued in this dataset prior to 1994 even though
cell phones were available about a decade earlier. For this reason, the usable data range
from 1994 to 2012, a 19-year period during which the data contain more than 296,000
household choices between the defined alternatives.
1I also supplement the interview data with diary data for CUs that do not have expenditures in
the interview data. In this case, I use variables TELRESD, UTLPROPI coded 96, and TELCELL for
appropriate years.
2The UCC for landline service is 270101 while the UCC for cell service is 270102
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APPENDIX B
CONSTRUCTED PRICE VARIABLES
In this section, I present two approaches to constructing prices from the expenditure
data. The main goal of these approaches is to construct a measure of the price of a single
phone. The first approach assumes all family sizes face the same prices. The second
approach allows for different family sizes to face different prices with the idea being that
families can get “family plans”, which offer discounts on multiple lines.
The first approach is to calculate the median expenditure by UCC for both cell and
landline among CUs with family size equal to one who have nonzero expenditure in that
category in a given year. This estimate assumes that CUs with family size of one only
purchase one landline or one cell phone service given they choose that option. This is a
reasonable assumption given that most individuals living alone do not have any reason to
purchase more than one of each service and the median will certainly avoid any outliers.
The second approach allows for a different price for each option, family-size, region,
year tuple. This approach is as follows:
1. Take the median expenditure on an option by single-person households with positive
expenditure in a category. Define this as the base price for the category, region, year
triple and do this for each of these triples.
2. For each family with family size greater than 1 and positive expenditure in a given
category, divide the expenditure by one and calculate the absolute difference between
this and the base price from step 1.
3. Repeat step 2 for each integer from 1 through the family size. That is, first divide
the expenditure by one, then divide it by two, and so forth.
4. From these multiple prices (there are the same number of possible prices as there
are individuals in the family), select the one with the smallest absolute difference
between it and the base price for the option, region, year triple and call this the
“temporary price”.
105
5. For each observed family size, define the price for the option as the median of this
“temporary price” among households of that family size with positive expenditure in
that category. Again, this step is done once for each option, region, year triple.
6. For some family sizes, there are no observations for an option. In this case, set the
price equal to the price for the next family size down.
In either case, the time-series obtained through this process is less than ideal, likely due
to changes in cell phone capabilies that require more extensive service plans indicating
higher prices even though comparable service plans are generally decreasing in price
through time. Nonetheless, my price proxies are highly correlated with the CPI categories
for landline and cell phone prices, with correlation coefficients of 0.8681 and 0.7746,
respectively.
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APPENDIX C
COMPUTATIONAL NOTES
The high quantity of simulation involved in the estimation strategy presents a
large computational burden. Specifically, for each draw of the MH algorithm, there are
10,000 particles drawn for each period, and for each of those period-particle pairs, the
likelihood of that period’s data must be computed for the parameters drawn. Worse still
is that these likelihood computations involve exponents and logarithms that are relatively
costly to compute. To provide some idea to substantiate the computational burden, the
likelihood of a single observation for a single period is given by:
p(Yt|βdt ) =
exp(Xitβ
X
ijt + Zjtβ
Z
it )
J∑
m=1
exp(XitβXimt + Zmtβ
Z
it )
.
This is then computed once for each particle for each observation in a given period, and
for each period. With about 15.5 thousand observations per period, 19 periods, and 10,000
particles, this involves computation of the above single-decision likelihood function about
3 billion times per MH draw. If I am concerned about Monte Carlo error and re-evaluate
the likelihood of the previous draw of MH, the total number of evaluations for estimation
doubles. Additionally, working in log-likelihoods, which is essential so the probabilities do
not get rounded to zero, also requires taking the log of each of these as well.
After computing the likelihood of each particle for a given period, the particles must
then be redrawn using the likelihood of each particle as a relative weight. The main MH
algorithm and much of the filter is programmed in Matlab. The computation of particle
likelihoods was initially coded in a Matlab MEX file with C++ to maximize speed and
is now in CUDA/C, but this level of simulation takes significant amounts of time. Using
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the University of Oregon’s Applied Computational Instrument for Scientific Synthesis
(ACISS) with 72GB RAM, and 12 processor cores or an NVIDIA M2070 GPU computing
likelihoods in parallel, the 81,000 MH draws, even with this relatively limited model, took
approximately four weeks on the parallel CPUs or as little as 6 days on the GPU. I have
since used the efficiency of the GPU to increase the number of MH draws to 500,000 which
has improved the precision of the posteriors significantly as the adaptive proposal has
become more efficient.
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APPENDIX D
ADDITIONAL TABLES
TABLE 19. Posterior Distributions for θ
ALT. VARIABLE PARAMETER 5th-tile 25th-tile Median 75th-tile 95th-tile StdDev
Price β1993 -3.87 -2.92 -2.25 -1.66 -1.13 0.63
σω 5.35 6.99 12.90 20.23 31.58 6.62
τ -1.38 -0.42 0.41 1.38 3.46 0.90
Cell Constant β1993 -68.30 -59.20 -49.54 -39.04 -25.35 10.08
σω 137.45 165.43 195.53 230.95 287.94 32.76
τ -15.70 3.11 17.26 25.74 35.05 11.31
Cell Age β1993 -40.94 -36.11 -31.22 -25.99 -20.06 5.06
σω 7.02 8.26 9.88 12.14 14.48 1.94
τ 0.61 1.57 2.60 3.58 4.82 1.01
Cell Family Size β1993 -37.21 -29.12 -19.96 -7.21 2.81 10.96
σω 53.98 69.59 90.04 130.84 195.65 30.63
τ 2.06 5.41 9.12 12.84 18.19 3.71
Both Constant β1993 -56.77 -47.81 -35.35 -21.24 -6.84 13.28
σω 54.60 62.41 68.56 77.09 85.04 7.34
τ 35.03 42.50 53.15 71.67 79.50 14.58
Both Age β1993 -6.43 -5.10 -3.84 -2.24 -0.66 1.43
σω 1.17 1.43 1.71 2.02 2.40 0.30
τ -0.37 -0.24 -0.11 0.02 0.11 0.13
Both Family Size β1993 -26.12 -12.71 -1.67 11.56 20.65 12.13
σω 31.94 40.00 48.59 59.03 71.87 9.52
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τ -30.35 -23.68 -15.96 -10.64 -4.96 6.52
TABLE 20. Posterior Distributions for βt
ALT. VARIABLE Year 5th-tile 25th-tile Median 75th-tile 95th-tile StdDev
Price 1994 -3.87 -2.92 -2.25 -1.66 -1.13 0.63
1995 -5.35 -4.33 -3.43 -2.62 -1.90 0.86
1996 -6.97 -5.82 -4.65 -3.61 -2.70 1.11
1997 -9.76 -8.11 -6.44 -5.10 -3.95 1.50
1998 -12.14 -9.88 -7.99 -6.33 -4.91 1.78
1999 -13.87 -11.24 -9.07 -7.24 -5.63 2.00
2000 -14.09 -11.38 -9.17 -7.39 -5.76 1.99
2001 -14.67 -11.71 -9.46 -7.53 -5.88 2.09
2002 -15.91 -12.75 -10.24 -8.14 -6.29 2.31
2003 -17.11 -13.69 -10.96 -8.74 -6.77 2.47
2004 -17.50 -13.93 -11.10 -8.83 -6.76 2.55
2005 -17.95 -14.31 -11.43 -9.06 -6.93 2.63
2006 -19.72 -15.83 -12.70 -10.14 -7.70 2.85
2007 -20.48 -16.42 -13.06 -10.40 -7.84 3.01
2008 -21.46 -17.10 -13.73 -10.79 -8.17 3.16
2009 -22.42 -17.93 -14.19 -11.18 -8.47 3.37
2010 -22.82 -18.12 -14.40 -11.21 -8.48 3.45
2011 -24.20 -19.13 -15.16 -11.83 -8.89 3.65
2012 -26.84 -21.15 -16.60 -12.93 -9.47 4.11
Cell Constant 1994 -147.07 -90.63 -51.05 -11.73 31.61 39.45
1995 -197.60 -115.69 -53.97 -3.71 51.15 55.99
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1996 -183.40 -92.52 -23.99 30.08 91.74 61.30
1997 -255.27 -137.29 -46.31 21.97 88.42 79.63
1998 -240.00 -121.23 -29.70 42.02 112.64 81.63
1999 -163.50 -65.72 10.16 75.20 142.86 70.46
2000 -134.29 -40.74 34.45 97.78 165.25 69.26
2001 -108.16 -13.89 59.94 123.64 190.28 68.77
2002 -49.79 28.17 92.51 148.25 207.21 60.04
2003 93.29 143.02 186.32 230.89 283.40 43.94
2004 143.61 189.06 231.78 276.11 327.85 43.52
2005 187.97 231.80 274.01 316.66 367.75 42.43
2006 203.26 245.85 285.72 328.64 376.85 41.40
2007 222.35 265.83 307.98 350.88 397.66 42.53
2008 261.28 308.56 354.40 401.51 452.69 46.47
2009 269.72 318.62 368.82 420.68 474.62 51.03
2010 299.25 355.11 409.33 464.13 526.04 54.51
2011 308.08 365.63 424.88 481.22 545.14 57.79
2012 309.64 369.27 424.68 480.66 539.00 55.69
Cell Age 1994 -41.29 -34.74 -29.26 -23.90 -17.57 5.42
1995 -40.45 -33.53 -27.52 -21.77 -15.78 5.88
1996 -32.55 -25.97 -20.35 -15.16 -10.35 5.40
1997 -33.90 -27.05 -21.33 -16.14 -11.11 5.45
1998 -27.82 -21.34 -15.91 -11.08 -6.90 5.13
1999 -16.37 -11.34 -7.60 -4.50 -2.05 3.42
2000 -11.67 -7.98 -5.25 -3.04 -1.09 2.47
2001 -8.47 -5.57 -3.45 -1.60 -0.02 1.99
2002 -7.47 -5.05 -3.27 -1.82 -0.48 1.62
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2003 -6.11 -4.47 -3.19 -2.10 -1.10 1.19
2004 -5.26 -3.96 -2.92 -2.03 -1.19 0.96
2005 -4.81 -3.70 -2.82 -2.03 -1.27 0.84
2006 -5.32 -4.26 -3.40 -2.60 -1.84 0.83
2007 -4.28 -3.44 -2.75 -2.10 -1.48 0.67
2008 -4.48 -3.61 -2.89 -2.24 -1.61 0.68
2009 -3.77 -3.03 -2.40 -1.81 -1.24 0.61
2010 -3.63 -2.95 -2.33 -1.75 -1.17 0.60
2011 -3.73 -3.01 -2.40 -1.82 -1.28 0.59
2012 -4.09 -3.36 -2.75 -2.16 -1.58 0.60
Cell Family Size 1994 -75.27 -47.04 -24.40 -1.60 22.25 22.72
1995 -108.38 -66.03 -37.51 -11.28 13.07 27.38
1996 -53.83 -26.51 -2.48 19.27 41.70 22.89
1997 -103.52 -61.11 -31.16 -4.62 20.04 28.24
1998 -131.08 -79.61 -44.21 -16.00 11.41 31.81
1999 -95.79 -60.60 -33.87 -12.85 6.47 23.87
2000 -120.13 -79.05 -49.25 -25.64 -4.71 26.70
2001 -142.93 -97.48 -63.09 -35.94 -13.69 30.77
2002 -71.98 -46.79 -27.80 -10.85 4.38 17.97
2003 -62.05 -42.80 -27.67 -14.54 -2.68 14.13
2004 -56.13 -39.60 -26.88 -15.94 -5.49 11.83
2005 -39.39 -28.07 -18.52 -9.57 -1.04 9.25
2006 -32.40 -22.50 -14.44 -7.19 -0.03 7.65
2007 -26.32 -18.14 -10.70 -4.01 2.94 7.07
2008 -29.85 -21.20 -13.79 -6.95 -0.21 7.12
2009 -25.03 -17.43 -10.79 -4.69 1.45 6.37
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2010 -20.17 -13.02 -6.67 -0.71 5.70 6.16
2011 -18.28 -11.61 -5.48 0.33 6.89 5.97
2012 -22.77 -15.82 -9.66 -3.39 3.29 6.21
Both Constant 1994 38.12 58.89 82.09 103.88 124.77 22.49
1995 81.58 111.13 143.27 177.27 209.80 33.07
1996 114.64 150.98 193.02 239.97 288.56 44.50
1997 140.74 181.90 229.69 287.63 350.22 52.87
1998 165.73 213.48 268.13 332.40 408.07 59.46
1999 193.12 247.34 308.43 383.13 473.98 67.90
2000 223.99 286.95 357.48 444.28 550.93 78.67
2001 255.27 324.64 406.50 503.77 629.47 89.56
2002 282.82 361.04 450.06 558.53 697.60 98.74
2003 308.34 394.17 493.33 613.48 769.59 109.65
2004 338.81 434.22 539.88 671.45 841.25 118.62
2005 370.79 472.83 585.49 734.25 910.63 130.71
2006 397.21 505.81 626.99 785.23 974.10 139.71
2007 424.44 544.71 675.78 845.65 1047.60 150.47
2008 456.07 581.62 722.41 897.06 1113.74 157.72
2009 483.79 621.24 770.44 952.30 1182.93 165.53
2010 516.17 661.06 816.50 1011.37 1256.32 175.16
2011 548.50 699.84 859.96 1063.04 1322.65 181.60
2012 574.55 731.57 900.57 1112.78 1385.08 190.61
Both Age 1994 -3.33 -1.92 -0.85 -0.26 0.12 0.83
1995 -0.73 -0.40 -0.21 -0.08 0.07 0.16
1996 -0.45 -0.27 -0.15 -0.04 0.06 0.11
1997 -0.29 -0.18 -0.09 -0.02 0.06 0.08
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1998 -0.25 -0.16 -0.08 0.00 0.07 0.08
1999 -0.34 -0.21 -0.10 0.00 0.11 0.11
2000 -0.30 -0.18 -0.08 0.02 0.13 0.10
2001 -0.29 -0.18 -0.08 0.02 0.12 0.10
2002 -0.43 -0.29 -0.16 -0.03 0.10 0.13
2003 -0.52 -0.33 -0.15 0.01 0.19 0.17
2004 -0.68 -0.46 -0.27 -0.09 0.10 0.18
2005 -0.78 -0.53 -0.30 -0.09 0.13 0.22
2006 -0.86 -0.59 -0.35 -0.11 0.14 0.24
2007 -0.97 -0.66 -0.38 -0.12 0.15 0.27
2008 -1.08 -0.75 -0.46 -0.18 0.11 0.28
2009 -1.25 -0.87 -0.52 -0.19 0.15 0.34
2010 -1.37 -0.92 -0.55 -0.17 0.21 0.37
2011 -1.56 -1.09 -0.68 -0.27 0.16 0.41
2012 -1.89 -1.36 -0.90 -0.46 0.02 0.45
Both Family Size 1994 -3.12 0.42 3.57 7.99 14.24 3.79
1995 -1.69 -0.28 0.86 2.14 3.75 1.21
1996 -2.50 -1.17 -0.04 1.03 2.16 1.10
1997 -1.28 -0.35 0.47 1.29 2.23 0.82
1998 -1.33 -0.44 0.38 1.21 2.13 0.83
1999 -2.02 -0.61 0.64 1.85 3.22 1.23
2000 -1.51 -0.30 0.80 2.00 3.25 1.15
2001 -1.85 -0.59 0.61 1.74 3.02 1.16
2002 -1.81 -0.23 1.36 2.86 4.59 1.55
2003 -2.68 -0.45 1.54 3.48 5.76 1.97
2004 -3.11 -0.75 1.52 3.85 6.45 2.30
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2005 -4.13 -1.25 1.53 4.20 7.42 2.73
2006 -2.50 0.39 3.28 6.39 9.71 3.00
2007 -2.66 1.12 4.87 8.63 12.85 3.75
2008 -3.25 0.33 3.64 7.14 11.25 3.40
2009 -4.96 -0.65 3.21 7.42 12.27 4.04
2010 -5.69 -0.82 3.55 8.29 13.54 4.56
2011 -9.04 -3.83 1.16 6.36 12.20 5.10
2012 -9.97 -4.25 1.19 6.69 12.67 5.47
115
REFERENCES CITED
Us wireless connections surpass population. http://www.ctia.org, 2013. CTIA - The
Wireless Association.
Matthew Gentzkow. Valuing new goods in a model with complementarity: Online
newspapers. American Economic Review, 2007a.
Robert F Engle. Dynamic conditional beta. Available at SSRN 2404020, 2014.
Jesu´s Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Juan Francisco Rubio-Ramı´rez. Estimating nonlinear
dynamic equilibrium economies: A likelihood approach. 2004.
Richard Ericson and Ariel Pakes. Markov-perfect industry dynamics: A framework for
empirical work. The Review of Economic Studies, 62(1):53–82, 1995a.
Patrick Bajari, C Lanier Benkard, and Jonathan Levin. Estimating dynamic models of
imperfect competition. Econometrica, 75(5):1331–1370, 2007.
Steven Berry, James Levinsohn, and Ariel Pakes. Automobile prices in market equilibrium.
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 841–890, 1995.
Matthew Gentzkow. Valuing new goods in a model with complementarity: Online
newspapers. American Economic Review, 2007b.
Robert W Crandall. Surprises from telephone deregulation and the at&t divestiture.
American Economic Review, 78(2):323–327, 1988.
Department of Justice. Voice Video and Broadband: The changing competitive landscape
and its impact on consumers. U.S. Dept of Justice, November 2008.
William E Taylor and Harold Ware. The effectiveness of mobile wireless service as a
competitive constrain on landline pricing: Was the DOJ wrong. NERA Economic
Consulting, December 2008.
Anastassios Gentzoglanis and Anders Henten. Regulation and the Evolution of the Global
Telecommunications Industry. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010.
Kenneth E Train, Daniel L McFadden, and Moshe Ben-Akiva. The demand for local
telephone service: A fully discrete model of residential calling patterns and service
choices. The RAND Journal of Economics, pages 109–123, 1987.
Mark Rodini, Michael R Ward, and Glenn A Woroch. Going mobile: substitutability
between fixed and mobile access. Telecommunications Policy, 27(5):457–476, 2003a.
116
Jeffrey T Macher, John W Mayo, Olga Ukhaneva, and Glenn Woroch. Demand in a
portfolio-choice environment: The evolution of telecommunications. Georgetown
Center for Business and Public Policy, 2013a.
Guy Klemens. The Cellphone: The History and Technology of the Gadget that Changed
the World. McFarland, 2010.
Jarice Hanson. 24/7: how cell phones and the Internet change the way we live, work, and
play. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007.
HistoryOfCellPhones.net. History of cell phones. http://www.HistoryOfCellPhones.net,
2008. Retrieved online.
Harald Gruber. The economics of mobile telecommunications. Cambridge University Press
Cambridge, 2005.
Eugenio J Miravete. Estimating demand for local telephone service with asymmetric
information and optional calling plans. The Review of Economic Studies, 69(4):
943–971, 2002.
Nicholas Economides, Katja Seim, and V Brian Viard. Quantifying the benefits of entry
into local phone service. the RAND Journal of Economics, 39(3):699–730, 2008.
Patrick Bajari, Jeremy T Fox, and Stephen P Ryan. Evaluating wireless carrier
consolidation using semiparametric demand estimation. Quantitative Marketing and
Economics, 6(4):299–338, 2008.
Christopher Garbacz and Herbert G Thompson Jr. Estimating telephone demand with
state decennial census data from 1970–1990: Update with 2000 data. Journal of
Regulatory Economics, 24(3):373–378, 2003.
James Alleman, Paul Rappoport, and Aniruddha Banerjee. Universal service: A new
definition? Telecommunications Policy, 34(1):86–91, 2010.
Kenneth E Train. Discrete choice methods with simulation. Cambridge university press,
2009.
BLS. Consumer Expenditure Survey User’s Documentation. US Dept of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, 2008.
Mark Rodini, Michael R Ward, and Glenn A Woroch. Going mobile: substitutability
between fixed and mobile access. Telecommunications Policy, 27(5):457–476, 2003b.
MichaelJ. Thacker and WesleyW. Wilson. Telephony choices and the evolution of cell
phones. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2015. ISSN 0922-680X. doi:
10.1007/s11149-015-9274-2.
117
Dennis W Carlton. The location and employment choices of new firms: an econometric
model with discrete and continuous endogenous variables. The Review of Economics
and Statistics, pages 440–449, 1983.
Timothy J Bartik. Business location decisions in the united states: Estimates of the effects
of unionization, taxes, and other characteristics of states. Journal of Business &
Economic Statistics, 3(1):14–22, 1985.
Cletus C Coughlin, Joseph V Terza, and Vachira Arromdee. State characteristics and the
location of foreign direct investment within the united states. The Review of
economics and Statistics, pages 675–683, 1991.
Keith Head and Thierry Mayer. Market potential and the location of japanese investment
in the european union. Review of Economics and Statistics, 86(4):959–972, 2004.
Thomas Doan, Robert Litterman, and Christopher Sims. Forecasting and conditional
projection using realistic prior distributions. Econometric reviews, 3(1):1–100, 1984.
Timothy Cogley and Thomas J Sargent. Drifts and volatilities: monetary policies and
outcomes in the post wwii us. Review of Economic dynamics, 8(2):262–302, 2005.
Jeffrey T Macher, John W Mayo, Olga Ukhaneva, and Glenn Woroch. Demand in a
portfolio-choice environment: The evolution of telecommunications. Georgetown
Center for Business and Public Policy, 2013b.
John Rust. Optimal replacement of gmc bus engines: An empirical model of harold
zurcher. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 999–1033, 1987.
V Joseph Hotz and Robert A Miller. Conditional choice probabilities and the estimation
of dynamic models. The Review of Economic Studies, 60(3):497–529, 1993.
Gautam Gowrisankaran and Marc Rysman. Dynamics of consumer demand for new
durable goods. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009.
Victor Aguirregabiria and Pedro Mira. Dynamic discrete choice structural models: A
survey. Journal of Econometrics, 156(1):38–67, 2010.
G Koop. Introduction to Bayesian Econometrics. John Wiley, 2003.
Heikki Haario, Eero Saksman, and Johanna Tamminen. Componentwise adaptation for
high dimensional mcmc. Computational Statistics, 20(2):265–273, 2005.
Heikki Haario, Eero Saksman, and Johanna Tamminen. An adaptive metropolis algorithm.
Bernoulli, pages 223–242, 2001.
Ira Sager. Before iphone and android came simon, the first smartphone.
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2012-06-29/
before-iphone-and-android-came-simon-the-first-smartphone, June 2012.
118
Apple, Inc. Apple reinvents the phone with iphone. http://www.apple.com/pr/library/
2007/01/09Apple-Reinvents-the-Phone-with-iPhone.html, January 2007.
Richard Ericson and Ariel Pakes. Markov-perfect industry dynamics: A framework for
empirical work. The Review of Economic Studies, 62(1):53–82, 1995b.
George W Evans and Seppo Honkapohja. Learning and expectations in macroeconomics.
Princeton University Press, 2001.
Fred Vogelstein. The untold story: How the iphone blew up the wireless industry.
http://archive.wired.com/gadgets/wireless/magazine/16-02/ff_iphone,
January 2008.
Bloomberg. How much did apple spend on r&d for the iphone? http:
//www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/b/f17e5186-51c1-43aa-8c18-c6851e042aae,
February 2013.
Min Jung Kim. The interdependence between smartphones and applications: The role of
platforms. In University of Minnesota Applied Microeconomics Workshop, 2012.
Joseph Cullen and Oleksandr Shcherbakov. Measuring consumer switching costs in the
wireless industry. Attachment, 1:09–191, 2010.
Ting Zhu, Hongju Liu, and Pradeep K Chintagunta. Wireless carriers exclusive handset
arrangements: An empirical look at the iphone. Available at SSRN 1962799, 2011.
Michael Sinkinson. Pricing and entry incentives with exclusive contracts: Evidence from
smartphones. Available at SSRN 2391745, 2014.
Rong Luo. The operating system network effect and carriers dynamic pricing of
smartphones. 2015.
Timothy Bresnahan, Joe Orsini, and Pai-Ling Yin. Platform choice by mobile app
developers. NBER Working Paper, 2014.
Ying Fan and Chenyu Yang. Competition, product proliferation and welfare: A study of
the us smartphone market. Available at SSRN 2506423, 2014.
Ulrich Doraszelski and Ariel Pakes. A framework for applied dynamic analysis in io.
Handbook of industrial organization, 3:1887–1966, 2007.
Stephen P Ryan. The costs of environmental regulation in a concentrated industry.
Econometrica, 80(3):1019–1061, 2012.
Boyan Jovanovic. Selection and the evolution of industry. Econometrica: Journal of the
Econometric Society, pages 649–670, 1982.
119
Ronald S Jarmin. Learning by doing and competition in the early rayon industry. The
RAND Journal of Economics, pages 441–454, 1994.
Ulrich Doraszelski, Gregory Lewis, and Ariel Pakes. Just starting out: Learning and
equilibrium in a new market. 2015.
Aviv Nevo. A practitioner’s guide to estimation of random-coefficients logit models of
demand. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 9(4):513–548, 2000.
Idc’s worldwide mobile phone tracker taxonomy, 2014.
Steven Ruggles, Matthew Sobek, Trent Alexander, Catherine A Fitch, Ronald Goeken,
Patricia Kelly Hall, Miriam King, and Chad Ronnander. Integrated public use
microdata series: Version 3.0 [machinereadable database]. minneapolis: Minnesota
population center [producer and distributor], 2004, 2010.
Google, Inc. Facts about googles acquisition of motorola.
https://www.google.com/press/motorola/, August 2011.
Thomas H Chia. Fighting the smartphone patent war with rand-encumbered patents.
Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 27:209–240, 2012.
120
